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I. INTRODUCTION

In the current environment, the scourge of biological and chemical
weapons is more prescient than ever. The anthrax attacks in 2001,
following closely after the events of September 11 th, as well as the fears
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regarding the potential use of smallpox as a weapon, have cast in sharp
relief the threat of biological toxins and the difficulty in preventing and
preparing for an attack. The fruitless search for biological and chemical
weapons in Iraq has also contributed to our understanding of how difficult
it is to gather reliable intelligence on the development of these weapons
and to locate and destroy them.
Contrary to the belief that anyone can possess and disseminate a
biotoxin capable of killing thousands, biological weapons remain too
difficult, expensive, and dangerous for many substate actors to produce
successfully.' Until the emergence of the Aum Shinrikyo cult, terrorists
seemed wedded to much more traditional implements of violence - guns
and bombs.2 The Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan had at its disposal over a
billion dollars, state of the art facilities, and prominent nuclear scientists
and biochemists among its membership. Nonetheless, the Shinrikyo cult
still failed several times in its attempt to produce and launch a biological
weapons attack before its attack on the Japanese subway system in March
1995.'
Terrorists are still likely to get more devastating results from
explosives than from germs, but while limited, the attempts to develop and
deploy these weapons are very real and very frightening.' While substate
actors still have trouble producing and using chemical and biological
weapons, these unconventional weapons remain the poor nation's nuclear
weapons,5 cheaper and easier to develop than atomic weapons and justified
by those who would develop them as the only way to counteract the
asymmetry of power between nuclear and nonnuclear states.6 The
development and proliferation of these weapons by less powerful nations
1. See, e.g., BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM 121 (1998); John Lauder, Testimony to
the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Mar. 3, 1999), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/I 999_hr/acdal 06.htn (last visited Feb. 24, 2005); Doctor Barbara
Hatch Rosenberg, Remarks to the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center's Twelfth
Nonproliferation Policy Reform Task Force Meeting (Aug. 10, 2000) [hereinafter Policy Reform
Meeting], availableat http://www.npec-web.org/projects/summaryl2.htm (last visited Feb. 24,
2005).
2. See HOFFmAN,supranote 1, at 121.
3. See id. at 121-27.
4. See id. at 198, 201-02.
5. Chemical and biological weapons are often referred to as the "poor man's nuclear
weapons," but perhaps "poor nation's nuclear weapons" is a more accurate description. See, e.g.,
Hillel W. Cohen et al., Bioterrorism Initiatives: Public Health in Reverse?, American Public Health
Association, availableat http://www.apha.org/journal/editorials/editcoh.htm (last visited July 24,
2005).
6. See Mohammed El Baradei, Editorial, Preemptionis not the Model, WASH. POST, Apr.
23, 2003, at A35.
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and by powerful substate actors is known in the military intelligence world
as an instance of "asymmetric warfare." 7 In 1999, the Central Intelligence
Agency stated that approximately a dozen nations either possessed or were
pursuing biological weapons capabilities.'
Another dimension of bioterrorism that adds to the magnitude of the
threat is the difficulty in detecting their presence. Small and easily hidden
in legitimate research facilities, biological weapons are exceptionally
difficult to detect. Claims made by the U.S. government to the Security
Council in February 2003 regarding the Iraqi weapons program proved to
be unfounded, despite repeated assertions by the Bush administration that
these agents would be discovered.9 Inspectors combed Iraq in search of
biological weapons - the purported existence of which was proffered as
justification for the U.S. invasion - but the head of the U.S. inspection
team, David Kay, ultimately concluded that no such weapons would be
found.1° In his testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee on
January 28, 2004, Mr. Kay stated that with regard to the Iraqi weapons
program, "we were all wrong."' '
While Kay's January report, his resignation, and his testimony to the
Senate Armed Services Committee were portrayed as political bombshells,
they were not entirely unexpected. Kay's interim report of October 2003
suggested that Saddam Hussein's chemical and biological weapons
capabilities had largely been destroyed by the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the
work of U.N. inspectors, and the air strikes ordered by President Clinton
in 1998.12 The interim report does provide evidence that Hussein's regime

7. See Lauder, supra note 1.
8. See id.
9. See, e.g., HANS BLIX, DISARMING IRAQ (2004); see also Richard W. Stevenson, Head of
Iraqi Arms Search May Be Ready to Step Down, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2003, EA, at 15 (citing
Donald Rumsfeld's statement to reporters on Dec. 16, 2003 that a hole the size of the one Saddam
Hussein was found in could hold enough biological weapons to kill tens of thousands ofpeople and
that it could be some time before the United States managed to find the hiding places of such
weapons).
10. See Telephone Interview by Reuters with David Key (Jan. 23, 2004), available at
http://www.peaceredding.org/Text%20of/o20 Reuters%20lnterview%20with%20David%2OKay.
htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
11. David Kay, Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee (Jan. 28,
2004), availableathttp://cerdipity.no-ip.com/verbatim/archives/000286.html (last visited Feb. 24,
2005).
12. See David Key, Statement on the Interim Progress Report on the Activities of the Iraq
Survey Group (ISG) Before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, The House
Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, and the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence 6 (Oct. 2, 2003) [hereinafter Kay Interim Report], available at http://cia.gov/
cia/public-affairs/speeches/2003/davidkay_10022003.html (last visited July 24, 2005).
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failed to cooperate with the United Nations and failed to disclose
information about long-range weapons and attempts at creating illegal
weapons, 3 but no evidence could be found to suggest that these programs
resulted in any weapons of note. 4 Indeed, Hussein's regime was
attempting to create weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) 5 Instead of a
massive chemical and biological weapons program that produced
stockpiles of deadly agents, however, it appears (as other political and
intelligence experts have suggested)16 that Hussein had been effectively
thwarted by U.N. inspections and by prior military action. As the U.S.
government begins its inquiries into the work of the intelligence
community, the question presented to us is whether continued reliance on
current intelligence gathering methods and the use of force are effective
methods of combating the scourge of biological and chemical weapons.
Intead of force, can the law be used to control the use of biological agents
and prevent the manufacturing and proliferation of biological weapons?
In May 2002, the U.S. Congress adopted the Public Health Safety and
Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2002 (Bioterrorism Act), to improve
readiness for a biological terror attack.'7 Section 201 of the Bioterrorism
Act codifies and amends provisions of section 511 of the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which regulated defined
biotoxins, called "select agents," by the Secretary of Health and Human
13. See id. at 1.
14. See id. at 6 (stating that Iraq did not have mustard gas or sarin, and that they could be
developed within two to six months and two years, respectively. Incidentally, it would likely take
any moderately developed country about these amounts of time to produce such weapons); id. at
7 (stating no steps were taken to actually produce nuclear weapons or fissile materials); id. at 4-5
(reference is made to resuming Biological Weapons programs and to furthering Biological
Weapons applicable research, but no reference is made to actual biological weapons (emphasis
added)).
15. See id.
16. Australian intelligence officer Andrew Wilkie, who resigned from his post at the Office
ofNational Assessments over this issue, stated in March 2003: "Iraq's weapons ofmass destruction
program is, I believe, genuinely contained. There is no doubt they have chemical and biological
weapons, but their program now is disjointed and limited. It's not a national WMD program like
they used to have." Laurie Oakes, The Insider, THE BULLETIN, Mar. 12, 2003, available at
http://bulletin.ninemsn.com.au/bulletin/EdDesk.nsf/All/IA33C 10272BF7A2CA256CE5008
37A10 (last visited Feb. 24, 2005). Jane's Chemical-Biological Defense Guidebook lists Iraq's
desires to retain and create CB weapons as very high, but cited the work of UNSCOM and the U.N.
sanctions regime as having significantly frustrated Iraq's ability to actual pursue such weapons
programs. JAVED ALl ET AL., JANE'S CHEMICAL-BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE GUIDEBOOK 281, 398-99

(1999).
17. See, e.g., Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of
2002, Pub. L. NO. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 21, 29,
42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Bioterrorism Act].
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Services (Secretary). 8 Section 201 of the Bioterrorism Act gives the
Secretary the regulatory power to determine which agents are a threat to
public health and safety.'9 Regulation of the transfer, 20 possession and
use, 21 registration and identification of agents and possessors of agents, 22
safeguard and security requirements, 23 and inspections 24 all fall within the
powers and responsibilities of the Secretary.25
Yet while the United States has moved to strengthen domestic control
and regulation of biotoxins, it has opposed similar efforts at the
international level. Just months before the terror attacks in September
2001, the U.S. delegation at the Geneva negotiations to create an
enforcement protocol for the Convention on the Prohibition of
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological)
and Toxin Weapons (BWC) declared the draft enforcement protocol (Draft
Protocol) useless and too weak to be effective. 26 A significant point of
contention between the supporters of the Draft Protocol and the U.S.
government was the question of inspections of private research facilities.27
The Draft Protocol called for both challenge inspections (those based upon
complaints or intelligence that suggest that a facility is in violation of the
BWC) and non-challenge inspections (those undertaken at random without
suspicion of violation) ofboth government and private research facilities.28
18. Id. § 201,116 Stat. at 637-46.
19. Id. § 201, 116 Stat. at 637-38.
20. Id. § 201, 116 Stat. at638.
21. Id.
22. Bioterrorism Act § 201, 116 Stat. at 638-39.
23. Id.§ 201, 116 Stat. at639-42.
24. Id. § 201, 116 Stat. at 642.
25. Id. § 201, 116 Stat. at 637-46.
26. Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, FAS Comments on U.S. Rejection of the BWC Protocol,
Address Before the NGO Seminar for the Ad Hoc Group, (July 25, 2001), available at
http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/cbw/papers/wg/wg_200 lus rejection-bwc_protocol.pdf(last
visited Feb. 24, 2005).
27. It is important to note that the United States is not the only party which is blocking
progress on the adoption of an enforcement protocol. In May 2001, during the 23rd session of the
Ad Hoc Group, a small group of countries (China, Cuba, Indonesia, Pakistan, Iran, Sri Lanka, and
Libya) submitted a working paper in opposition to the use of the Chairman's composite draft of the
protocol. This opposition likely would have proved a significant obstacle to continuing work on the
protocol had attention not been diverted to the U.S. opposition to the protocol in July 2001. See
Nicholas A. Sims, Route-Maps to the OPBW: Using the ResumedB WC Fifth Review Conference,
56 CBW CONVENTIONS BULL. 2, 4 (June 2002). Work on the protocol is done on a consensus basis
and the U.S. opposition was enough to derail the process. As such, these nations, whose positions
are at odds with the vast majority of States Parties, have been able to avoid scrutiny. See id.
28. See Procedural Report from the Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological)
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In this case, it was not a recalcitrant dictator fighting the imposition of
intrusive and unwanted inspections, it was the U.S. pharmaceutical
industry that opposed the use of inspections (except in very limited cases)
to monitor compliance with the BWC. The Bioterrorism Act exempts
research facilities, including those of the pharmaceutical industry, from
inspections under section 201 29 Before avoiding heavy burdens associated
with inspections within domestic legislation, the pharmaceutical industry
had earlier lobbied to avoid facing inspections under international
control.3" The concerns of the pharmaceutical industry were largely based
on issues of protecting confidential business information (CBI) and
protecting the reputations of American pharmaceutical companies.3 ' On
the other side of the balance were scientists and policymakers who claimed
that no enforcement mechanism would have any hope of preventing the
development and proliferation
of biological weapons without a robust
32
inspection process.
This Article examines briefly, in Part II, the history of biological
weapons control (including the unique challenges posed by biological
weapons) and the move toward a Draft Protocol on enforcement and
verification. In Part II, this Article then turns to the different positions
taken with regard to nonproliferation and the role of the Draft Protocol,
including the positions taken by the States Parties and relevant substate
actors and the political and legal arguments for and against the Protocol.
Part IV reviews the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) for
comparison. It will then draw upon the comparison to the CWC and the
recommendations of involved parties to suggest solutions that take into
account the characteristics of biological weapons that make them
profoundly different from other WMDs. Finally, in Part V, this Article
shows that the concerns of the U.S. government and the pharmaceutical
industry can be sufficiently mitigated though these suggested solutions and
that the benefits of supporting the international enforcement of the BWC
far outweigh any associated costs.

and Toxin Weapons and Their Destruction (Mar. 1, 2001), Annex I, 39-40, 90 [hereinafter Draft
Protocol].
29. See Bioterrorism Act § 201, 116 Stat. at 642-32.
30. See PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA, PHRMA POSITION

ON A COMPLIANCE PROTOCOL TO THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (1997) [hereinafter
PHRMA].
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS, PROPOSALS FOR U.S. IMPLEMENTING
LEGISLATION FoR THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION PROTOCOL (2000) [hereinafter FAS

Implementation Proposals].
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I. BACKGROUND

A. The History of Biological Weapons andAttempts to ProhibitThem
The first recorded intentional uses of biological agents in warfare date
to 1346 and the catapulting of plague ridden corpses into the city of Kaffa
in Crimea by the Tartars laying siege to the city. The plague spread
throughout the population of the city, which was then surrendered.
Survivors of Kaffa, carrying the bacteria, returned to Italy, where the
plague quickly spread, killing 20 million people over the next four years.3 3
Another early use of biological weapons occurred during the French and
Indian wars (1754-63), when Colonel Henry Bouquet and Lord Jeffrey
Amherst, commanding general of British forces in North America, devised
a strategy of delivering smallpox infested blankets to the American Indian
populations.34
In 1868, the Imperial Cabinet of Russia assembled an International
Military Commission to establish the limits "at which the necessities of
war ought to yield to the requirements of humanity."35 The resulting
Declaration of St. Petersburg proclaimed that the employment of arms
which needlessly aggravated the suffering of disabled soldiers or rendered
their deaths inevitable would be contrary to the laws of humanity.36 The
Declaration of St. Petersburg, however, only applied among contracting or
acceding parties.37 If a contracting party fought against a nonmember, no
prohibition was assumed. Also, once a nonmemberjoined in the hostilities
on the side of any contracting or acceding party, the Declaration would
cease to be obligatory.38 The St. Petersburg Declaration did not specifically
single out biological or chemical weapons as prohibited. The first explicit
reference to chemical or biological weapons in an international declaration

33. Adrienne Mayor, Dirty Tricks in Ancient Warfare, 10 Q.J. OF MIL.HIST. 1, 32 (1997).
34. See Letter from Colonel Henry Bouquet, to General Jeffery Amherst (July 13, 1763),
availableathttp://www.nativeweb.org/pages/legal/amherst/34_40_305_fii.jpeg (last visited Feb.
24, 2005); Letter from General Jeffery Amherst to Colonel Henry Bouquet (July 16, 1763),
available at http://www.nativeweb.org/pages/legal/amherst/34_41_114_fi.jpeg (last visited Feb.
24, 2005).
35. 1868 ST. PETERSBURG DECLARATION, Nov. 29, 1868, pmbl., available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/decpeter.htm (last visited July 24, 2005).
36. See id.; see alsoALEXANDER KELLE & JIRI MATOUSEK, Lessons ofthe Chemical Weapons
Convention for the BTWC Protocol, in THE ROLE OF BIOTECHNOLOGY IN COUNTERING BTW
AGENTS, 33 (Alexander Kelle et al. eds., 2001).
37. 1868 DECLARATION OF ST. PETERSBURG, supra note 35.
38. Id.
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was in the Declaration on Laws and Methods of Conducting Wars, which
prohibited inter alia the use of poisons and poisoned weapons.39 This
declaration, signed in Brussels on August 27, 1874, never entered into
force for lack of ratification.4"
The same prohibition, however, was incorporated into the Convention
on the Laws and Customs of Land Warfare, drafted and signed by the great
powers of Europe (no nations outside of Europe participated in the
process) in July 1899." 1 The Fourth Hague Convention on the Laws of
War, which was drafted by the European powers and without the U.S.
participation, also banned the use of specified types of weapons, including
poisons and arms calculated to cause unnecessary suffering.4 2
During World War I, although no biological agents were used by the
belligerent parties, chemical weapons were used extensively and are
estimated to have resulted in over a million casualties, including 100,000
deaths.43 The Hague Convention completely failed to prevent the use of
chlorine and mustard gas by the belligerents, perhaps because the Hague
Conventions only applied to conflicts in which all belligerents were parties
to the Convention. 44
In response to the horrors of chemical warfare in World War I, the
great powers signed the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the
Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Protocol), although again,
the United States was not a party and did not become a party to the
convention until 1975. 4 ' The Geneva Protocol addresses solely the use of
chemical and biological agents in war and does not directly discuss the

39. See KELLE & MATOUSEK, Lessons of the Chemical Weapons Conventionfor the BTWC
Protocol,in THE ROLE OF BIOTECHNOLOGY IN COUNTERING BTW AGENTS, supra note 36, at 34.
40. Howard S. Levie, History of the Law of War on Land, 838 INT'L REV. RED CROSS,
339-50(2000), availableathttp://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList304/114E245DA228
6D1BC1256B66005E8ACC (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
41. LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR ON LAND, July 29, 1899, Annex to the Convention, art. 23,
availableat http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/hague02.htm#art23 (last visited Feb.
24, 2005).
42. LAwS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR ON LAND, Oct. 18, 1907, Annex to the Convention, art. 23
[hereinafter HAGUE IV], available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/hague04.
htm#art23 (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
43. STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, The Chemical Weapons
Convention Fact Sheet (Apr. 1997) [hereinafter SIPRI], availableat http://projects.sipri.se/cbw/
research/ssf-cwc-fs-eif.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
44. HAGUE IV, supra note 42, art. 2.
45. See SIPRI, Contracting Parties to the Geneva Protocol, availableat http://www.sipri.
org/contents/cbwarfare/bwresearchdoc/cbw historical/cbw-hist-geneva-parties.htm.
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production, stockpiling, or destruction of these agents.46 The Geneva
Protocol was the first international instrument that distinguished between
been lumped
chemical and biological agents, which had previously
' 7
together in the category of "poisonous weapons. 1
Despite the extensive usage of chemical weapons by all sides in World
War I, these weapons were largely unused by the belligerents in battle in
World War II. The Axis powers did not show such restraint against
civilian populations. Chemical agents were used by the Nazis in
extermination camps, most infamously, Zyklon B, the commercial name
for hydrocyanic acid used in the gas chambers.4" Japanese forces
occupying China used biological agents on a limited scale in gruesome
experiments.4 9 Considering the fact that the U.S. deployment of atomic
weapons was also against civilian targets, it was not armies, but civilians,
who bore the entirety of the costs of the use of WMDs during World War
II. Kelle and Matousek argue that the nonuse of chemical and biological
weapons in battle in World War II was based on three factors: reciprocal
warnings of in-kind retaliation by the belligerents; lack of preparation by
the militaries to use such weapons; and a "general feeling of abhorrence
on the part of the governments for the use of CB [chemical-biological]
weapons." 5 °
While the taboo against the use of chemical and biological weapons
was clearly not enough to prevent the use of such agents against
concentration camp prisoners, the combined threat of in-kind retaliation
by opposing forces and the uncertain military value of deploying such
weapons rendered chemical and biological agents a non-issue on the
battlefield in World War II. In a war known for its cruelty toward civilians
and soldiers alike, this battlefield chivalry and refusal to employ cruel
weapons seems perversely out of place. Nonetheless, World War II

46. See, e.g., Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94
L.N.T.S. 65 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol].
47. See KELLE & MATOUSEK, Lessons of the Chemical Weapons Conventionfor the BTWC
Protocol,in THE ROLE OF BIOTECHNOLOGY INCOUNTERING BTW AGENTS, supra note 36, at 34.

48. Kyle R. Jacobson, Doing Business with the Devil: The Challenges of Prosecuting
CorporateOfficials Whose Business Transactions Facilitate Ware Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity, 56 A.F. L. REV. 167, 193-95 (2005).
49. Harald Mijeller, Dealingwith a Headache:Three Scenariosand Two Dilemmas, in THE
ROLE OF BIOTECHNOLOGY IN COUNTERING BTW AGENTS, supranote 36, at 1.
50. See KELLE & MATOUSEK, Lessons of the Chemical Weapons Conventionfor the BTWC
Protocol,in THE ROLE OF BIOTECHNOLOGY IN COUNTERING BTW AGENTS, supra note 36, at 35
(quoting ALMQVIST & WIKSELL INTERNATIONAL, THE PROBLEM OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL
WARFARE 4 (1971)).
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signaled growing international consensus in humanitarian law on the
prohibition of chemical and biological weapons.
The development of this sentiment was by no means completed at the
end of the World War H. In looking at the evolving consensus against the
use of both biological and chemical weapons, it is helpful to make the
distinction between chemical and biological agents first made in the
Geneva Protocol. Since World War 11, chemical weapons have been used
in war and otherwise. The United States employed chemical agents during
the Vietnam War, 5' and chemical weapons were used extensively during
the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s.52 Hussein's regime also used chemical
weapons against domestic populations including the Kurds in northern Iraq
and the Shi'a in the south.53 The use of biological weapons, on the other
hand, has generally been limited to terrorist attacks such as the anthrax and
ricin mailings in the United States.54 Differences in the potency of
chemical and biological weapons, their ease of development, and their
latency periods (all of which will be discussed in Part 11) led the
international community to regulate them differently in the post war
period.55 While the Geneva Protocol covering both chemical and biological
weapons, is still in force, separate conventions on biological and chemical
weapons have since been promulgated. 6
The decision to bifurcate the debate on chemical and biological
weapons and deal with each type of weapon separately was a contentious
one. In 1968, the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee of the United
Nations put the question of chemical and biological weapons on its agenda
under the heading of nonnuclear measures. 7 The United Kingdom
suggested that the issues presented by chemical and biological weapons
could be better addressed if the two methods of warfare were dealt with
separately.58 The following year, the United Kingdom presented to the
51. For a discussion on the U.S. use of chemical agents in southeast Asia, see VICTOR A.
UTGOFF, THE CHALLENGE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, 67-74, 88-90, 94-97 (St. Martin's Press ed.,
1991).
52. See id. at 80-86.
53. See generally RICHARD BUTLER, SADDAM DEFIANT (2000).
54. See Dana A. Shea, Terrorism: Background on Chemical, Biological, and Toxin Weapons
and Options for Lessening Their Impact, Congressional Research Service, Dec. 1, 2004, available
at www.fas.org/irp/crs/rl31669.pdf.
55. UNITED NATIONS, U.N. INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH, THE THIRD REVIEW

OF THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: ISSUES AND PROPOSALS, at 2, U.N. Doc. 91/17 (1991)
[hereinafter U.N. Doc. 91/17].
56. Draft Protocol, supra note 28; CWC, infra note 109.
57. ERHARD GEISSLER, STRENGTHENING THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION 5 (Oxford
Univ. Press ed., 1990).
58. U.N. Doc. 91/17, supra note 55.
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Convention of the Committee on Disarmament (the Eighteen Nation
Disarmament Committee's successor), a draft convention prohibiting
biological methods of warfare. The Convention of the Committee on
Disarmament also had before it a draft convention submitted previously
to the General Assembly by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries
on the prohibition of the development, production, and stockpiling of
biological and chemical weapons.5 9
At the 1970 session of the Convention of the Committee on
Disarmament, the main question for discussion was whether the two types
of weapons should be dealt with separately or in conjunction. The United
States supported the U.K. position on the grounds that chemical weapons
had been used in modem warfare and getting states to abandon their
chemical weapons programs would prove more difficult than banning
biological weapons, which had largely remained unused in modem
warfare. 6' As a consequence of this difference between the two types of
weapons, the United States argued that the Committee of the Convention
on Disarmament should turn its attention to biological weapons first so
that the more complicated issues involved with chemical weapons would
not hold up the prohibition on biological weapons. 61 The United States
claimed no preference for banning one type of weapon before the otherit was merely the issue of ripeness that pushed the U.S. position.62
In 1971, the socialist states in the Convention of the Committee on
Disarmament agreed to the approach put forward by the United States and
the United Kingdom.63 On August 5, 1971, the draft text of the Biological
Weapons Convention (BWC) was submitted to the committee. 6 After
some revisions, it was annexed to the committee's report to the General
Assembly. The General Assembly commended the Convention in its
Resolution 2826 (XXVI) of December 16, 1971, to which the BWC was
annexed.65
The BWC was opened for signature in 1972 and entered into force in
1975. The BWC was not a response to any particularized threat or use of
biological weapons, but was instead drafted in response to the fact that
Lological weapons are relatively easy
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produce, stockpile, and conceal and they have a potentially devastating

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

See GEISSLER, supra note 57, at 6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See U.N. Doc. 91/17, supra note 55, at 2.
See GEISSLER, supra note 57, at 6.
G.A. Res. 2826, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., art. XXVI, U.N. Doc. A/2826 (1971).
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impact.66 The BWC calls upon States Parties: to refrain from developing
such weapons, to destroy any dangerous biological agents that do not have
peaceful purposes, and to prevent the proliferation of such agents.6 7 It also
requires that States Parties ban delivery systems for such agents. 68 The
BWC does not explicitly prohibit the use of biological weapons. Instead
it affirms the 1925 Geneva Protocol and all duties stemming from that
agreement.69 It was anticipated that Review Conferences of the States
Parties would be held periodically.7 ° With the exception of a handful of
nations, all countries in the world are States Parties to the BWC.7 '
While the BWC calls for cooperation among its States Parties to ensure
compliance, like the Geneva Protocol before it, the BWC lacked
provisions for enforcement and monitoring. States Parties assumed and
envisaged that complaints regarding noncompliance would be lodged with
the U.N. Security Council.7 2 Concerns over the inadequacy of verification
measures were expressed at the First Review Conference held in March
1980 in Geneva.73 In the unanimously adopted Final Declaration of the
conference, it was agreed that the Article V provisions for consultation and
cooperation were broad and flexible enough to allow States Parties to use
various international procedures to effectively and adequately ensure the
implementation of the BWC.74 The Final Declaration also reiterated that
States Parties could request consultations with other States Parties to
ensure compliance and that States Parties could lodge complaints with the
Security Council. 5 No other concrete progress was made in clarifying

Article V, or in formulating more robust compliance measures.76
During the 1980s, changes in biotechnology meant that prior military
apathy toward biological weapons as an effective tool of warfare could not

66. MOELLER, Dealingwith a Headache: Three Scenariosand Two Dilemmas, in THE ROLE
OF BIOTECHNOLOGY IN COUNTERING BTW AGENTS, supranote 36, at 2.

67. Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons, Apr. 10, 1972, arts. 1,11, 111, & IV, 1015 U.N.T.S.
163 (entered into force Mar. 26, 1975) [hereinafter BWC].
68. GEISSLER, supra note 57, at 7.
69. See BWC, supranote 67.
70. See GEISSLER, supra note 57, at 7.
71. See Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Website, at http://www.opbw.org.
72. See id.
73. Biological Weapons Convention, First Review Conference, Final Declaration, Mar. 3-21,
1980, (adopted Mar. 21, 1980),availableat http://projects.sipri.se/cbw/docs/bw-btwc-reviewconf1.html, BWC/CONF.1I/10 (last visited July 24, 2005).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See GEISSLER, supra note 57, at 8.
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be expected to continue into the future." The key assumption that had led
states to believe it would be easier to ban biological weapons first had
been dramatically undercut. Biological weapons were previously
considered impractical because of the danger to handling personnel.7" They
were also considered relatively difficult to manufacture.79 These weapons
are also difficult to direct in warfare and linger for considerable periods of
time, putting at risk civilians and the forces deploying the weapons as well
as the intended targets."0 As a result of these problems, biological weapons
had been considered too unpredictable and uncontrollable to be effective
tools of warfare."' In 1986, however, the U.S. Department of Defense
declared in its Biological Defense Program that biotechnology had made
biological warfare much more feasible and effective. 2 As a result of
advances in biotechnology, germs were being produced that were
consistent, highly contagious, and effective in low dosages.8 3
The Second Review Conference was held in September 1986 in
Geneva. Concerned about advances in biotechnology, the States Parties
agreed to a series of confidence building measures (CBM) to promote
openness and the exchange of information." The States Parties also agreed
that the BWC covered new developments and advances in biotechnology.8
This question had arisen due to the fact that the prohibition in the BWC on
weapons "whatever their origin or method of production" 6 only modifies
toxins and not other biological agents according to a strict reading of the
text.87 While this interpretation of the text by the States Parties is not
technically binding, it represents subsequent practice agreed to by the
parties as defined by Article 31, paragraph 36 of the Vienna Convention
on the Laws of Treaties. 8 Biological agents were defined authoritatively
by the World Health Organization (WHO) in its 1970 report on the health

77. Id.
78. See id. at 18.
79. Id.
80. See id.
81. GEISSLER, supra note 57, at 18.
82. See id. at 8.
83. See id.
84. Biological Weapons Convention, Second Review Conference, Final Declaration, Sept.
8-26, 1986, (adopted Sept. 26, 1986) [hereinafter Second Review Conference], available at
http://projects.sipri.se/cbw/docs/bw-btwc-reviewconf-2.html,BWC/CONF.II/13/1I (last visited July
24, 2005).
85. Id.
86. See Second Review Conference, supra note 84.
87. Draft Protocol, supra note 28.
88. Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties, art. 31, 36, 115 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into
force Jan. 27, 1980).
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aspects of biological and chemical weapons.89 Biological agents are those
that depend for their effects on multiplication within the target organism
and are intended for use in war to cause disease or death in humans,
animals, or plants.9 ° Toxins are poisonous products of organisms and,
unlike biological agents, are inanimate.9"
Several of the States Parties at the Second Review Conference
suggested that an amendment to the BWC, while outside the purview of
the Review Conference, might be necessary to enhance compliance.92
Others, including the United States, held that no amendment was
necessary.93 All parties agreed that the possibility of an amendment could
not be considered until after the conclusion of negotiations for the CWC.9 4
Strengthening measures designed to work within the BWC's already
existing framework, which were considered, fell into two categories those concerned with implementation issues and those designed to build
confidence and foster the exchange of information.95 The Final Declaration
clarified procedures for calling for consultation (but did not give a formal
role to the U.N. Secretary General, despite the fact that the Secretary
General is called upon to aid in the dissemination of relevant
information). In terms of fostering information exchanges and increasing
transparency, the Final Declaration called for the exchange, among States
Parties, of information on research facilities and labs that met very high
international or national safety standards for handling high-risk agents or
had biological programs related to the BWC.9 7 The Final Declaration
called for: exchange of information of all abnormal outbreaks of infectious
diseases; publication of relevant research in widely-available scientific
journals; and contact among scientists in the field.98 The States Parties also
agreed to have meetings of scientific and technical experts to facilitate the
information exchange called for in the Final Declaration.99 These

89. World Health Organization, Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons (lst
ed. 1970), availableat www.who.int.
90. U.N. Doc. 91/17, supra note 55, at 5.
91. Id.
92. See GEISSLER, supra note 57, at 10.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See Second Review Conference, supra note 84.
96. See id.
97. Id.
98. See id.
99. See id.
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exchanges took place in 1987, 1988, and 1989 in the lead up to the Third
Review Conference in 1991 .'
Reviewing the history of the BWC and the various attempts to
strengthen it, it becomes evident that the success of this rather toothless
convention has been dubious. In 1992, President Boris Yeltsin admitted
that the Soviet Union had an offensive biological weapons program despite
the fact that the Soviet Union (and later its successor, the Russian
Federation) had acted as an official depository state of the BWC.'0
Despite the fact that it was readily known that Saddam Hussein used
unconventional weapons against domestic and foreign enemy groups, Iraq
did not admit to its offensive biological weapons program until 1995, and
it was not until the defection of Hussein's son-in-law, General Hussein
Kamel to Jordan on August 7, 1995, that it became clear that Iraq could
deliver biological agents by aerial bombs and SCUD missiles. 102
The consultation and complaint system of enforcement is further
hindered by the expectation that nations making complaints to the Security
Council in accordance with Article VI include in the complaint all possible
evidence confirming the validity of the complaint. °3 Few states have the
means to collect such evidence against supposed violators."° The likely
result of this system would be, at best, inaccurate and vague complaints,
and at worst, politically motivated ones. This was indeed, the actual result
of the system of reporting noncompliance.10 ' Two of the most famous
claims regarding noncompliance were brought by the United States against
the Soviet Union." 6 The first dealt with claims that anthrax spores had
been released from a Soviet Biological facility in the city of Sverdlovsk."°7
The second was a claim that the Soviet Union used a poisonous material
known as yellow rain in military campaigns in Laos, Kampuchea, and

100. See GEISSLER, supra note 57, at 13.
101. GRAHAM S. PEARSON, CounteringBiological Warfare: An Overview, in THE ROLE OF
BIOTECHNOLOGY IN COUNTERING BTW AGENTS, supra note 36, at 9, 13. The United States had
, ade

ther claims aeout the Sonviet union emnlnIna hinonnolen

nd rhemircl wennnn
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1980s, though these claims are disputed. For a discussion of the allegations made that an illegal
biological weapons facility exploded in Sverdlovsk in 1979, that the Soviets used "yellow rain" in
Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, and that the Soviets were creating biological weapons through
genetic engineering, see LEONARD A. COLE, Sverdlovsk, Yellow Rain, and Novel Soviet
Bioweapons: Allegations and Responses, in PREVENTING A BIOLOGICAL ARMS RACE (1990).
102. See PEARSON, Countering Biological Warfare: An Overview, in THE ROLE OF
BIOTECHNOLOGY INCOUNTERING BTW AGENTS, supranote 36, at 13-14.

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

SIPRI, supra note 43.
See U.N. Doc. 91/17, supranote 55, at 9.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Afghanistan, beginning in 1978. Neither of these reports of alleged
noncompliance was settled satisfactorily."°8 From the very early days of
the BWC, it was clear that the enforcement provisions were flawed.
Numerous attempts have been made over the years to address these flaws,
but without significant success.
In contrast, the CWC is relatively new, having entered into force in
1997 complete with a Verification Annex. ° 9 The Verification Annex
includes procedures for monitoring, site inspections, destruction of
chemical weapons, a database registry for agents that can be used as
precursors for the creation of chemical weapons, and a Confidentiality
Annex to protect sensitive information gathered in the verification and
monitoring process." 0 The CWC was promulgated largely in response to
the use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq war, as opposed to the
vague threat of potential use of such weapons behind the BWC."' The
Verification Annex of the CWC met with much less resistance from
private industry than the Draft Protocol to the BWC. While the
pharmaceutical industry was viewed as an opponent to the Draft Protocol
to the BWC, the chemical industry played a constructive role in creating
the CWC." 2
Real differences between chemical and biological agents that can be
used as weapons are a significant cause for this difference in approach
between the pharmaceutical industry and the chemical industry regarding
enforcement mechanisms. Nonetheless, dollar for dollar, biological
weapons are by far the most devastating WMDs, and yet, they are the least
strictly regulated under international law. "' The weakness of international
prohibitions on biological weapons has not escaped worldwide notice.
B. The Move TowardEnforcement
The gap between law and practice has led the experts and the states
parties to the BWC themselves to consider thoroughly the subject of
enforcement. From the very early history of the BWC, it was clear that the
108. See id.at 13-14.
109. See Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Chemical Weapons and Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 800 (entered into force Apr.
29, 1997) [hereinafter CWC].
110. See id. Chemical Annex, Verification Annex & Confidentiality Annex.
1 11. Mueller, Dealing with a Headache: Three Scenarios and Two Dilemmas, in THE ROLE
OF BIOTECHNOLOGY IN COUNTERING BTW AGENTS, supra note 36, at 1.
112. RENt VAN SLOTEN, Biotechnology and the Strengtheningof the BTWC, in THE ROLE OF
BIOTECHNOLOGY IN COUNTERING BTW AGENTS, supra note 36, at 47.
113. PEARSON, Countering Biological Warfare: An Overview, in THE ROLE OF
BIOTECHNOLOGY IN COUNTERING BTW AGENTS, supranote 36, at 9.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol17/iss1/7

16

Kazemi: Ill at Ease: The Precarious State of the Biological Weapons Conve

20051

ILL ATEASE: THE PRECARIOUS STATE OF THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

153

enforcement and verification mechanisms were lacking and in need of
clarification and strengthening. As stated above, at the Second Review
Conference in 1987, the States Parties agreed to politically binding
information exchanges as CBM to ensure compliance with the BWC,
including meetings of scientific experts in the years between the Second
and Third Review Conferences.
This approach proved inadequate, and the States Parties began
searching for legally binding measures of compliance. At the 1991 Third
Review Conference, the States Parties launched VEREX, a two-year study
by the verification experts of the States Parties to determine the feasibility
of verification measures.114 The verification experts' report was presented
in 1994 at a special conference, which established an Ad Hoc Group to
negotiate a protocol to strengthen the BWC. 115
Negotiations on a rolling text of the Draft Protocol began in 1997 and
were generally met with enthusiastic responses from States Parties. In
1997, the North Atlantic Council meeting welcomed "improving
protections against biological weapons."'1 16 In 1998, the European Union,
the G8 countries, Australia, and the Nonaligned Movement all expressed
their support for the Draft Protocol and its adoption." 7 President Bill
made the adoption of the Draft Protocol a policy priority that
Clinton
118
year.

The members of the Ad Hoc Group negotiated individual articles one
at a time, and after general agreement on the wording of an article
developed, the article was incorporated into the text of the Draft Protocol.
Areas of contention were divided into three categories - Category I:
"Little Controversy, relatively easy to resolve;" Category II: "Medium
level of disagreement;" Category 1I: "Strong conceptual differences in
views."" 9 As these issues were resolved, the Draft Protocol moved closer
and closer to completion. The ad hoc group presented its Draft Protocol at
a special conference in 2001. Despite strong commitment by the United

114. FAS Implementation Proposals, supra note 32.
115. Id.
116. Press Release, NATO, Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defence Ministers
Session, Final Communiqu6 (June 12, 1997).
117. See PEARSON, Countering Biological Warfare: An Overview, in THE ROLE OF
BIOTECHNOLOGY INCOUNTERING BTW AGENTS, supra note 36, at 16.
118. See id. at l7.
119. Graham Pearson et al., The BTWC Protocol: Proposed Complete Text for an Integrated
Regime 1-2 (Sept. 2000), availableat http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/evaulation/evalul9.pdf
(last visited July 24, 2005).
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States to fighting bioterrorism and preventing the
proliferation of WMDs,
20
the United States opposed the Draft Protocol.1
Interestingly, the United States was very supportive of the Draft
Protocol during the process of its creation, and only expressed significant
reservations beginning July 25, 2001, when the Draft Protocol was
presented at a special conference. Given the rolling nature of the text of the
Draft Protocol, information about the contents of the protocol and the
debated provisions were made available as each round of negotiations by
the Ad Hoc Group was completed. During the 1998 rounds of negotiations,
the United States subscribed to the rolling text of the Draft Protocol
presented, "including declarations, visits (non-challenge, or routine
inspections), investigations
(challenge inspections), and an implementing
' 12
organization.

1

There is, in fact, a noticeable divide between U.S. positions prior to
2001 and after. In his State of the Union Address of January 27, 1998,
President Clinton stated:
now we must act to prevent the use of disease as a weapon of war
and terror. The Biological Weapons Convention has been in effect
for twenty-nine years. The rules are good, but the enforcement is
weak and we must strengthen
it with a new international system to
1 22
detect and deter cheating.

In 1998, the United States expressed the view that declarations should
cover a range of facilities and activities of potential relevance under the
Convention, and in March 2000, suggested a compromise package of
declaration triggers. 23 In May 1998, Clinton announced a major U.S.
initiative against biological weapons:
[w]e must strengthen the international Biological Weapons
Convention with a strong system of inspections to detect and
prevent cheating. This is a major priority. It was part of my State of

120. FAS Implementation Proposals, supranote 32.
121. Federation of American Scientists, U.S. Public Positions on the BTWC Protocol (2001)
[hereinafter U.S. Public Positions], availableat http://www.fas.org/bwc/news/USPublicPositions
OnProtocol.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
122. President William Jefferson Clinton, State of the Union Address Before a Joint Session
of Congress (Jan. 27, 1998).
123. U.S. Public Positions, supra note 121.
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the Union address earlier this year and we are
working with other
1 24
nations and our industries to make it happen.
In 2001, the U.S. position was that the declaration triggers covered an
almost randomly-selected set of facilities rather than establishing a
systematic approach to inspections. 125 On the issue of random visits, the
United States made several proposals in 2000, most of which weakened
the provisions of the Draft Protocol to limit visits to the status of CBM, not
as a method of verifying declarations. The United States proposed nonadversarial visits, not inspections, and suggested that teams not draw any
conclusion or make any finding in their reports. 26 In a July 25, 2001
statement made to the Ad Hoc Group, the United States claimed that
random visits served no purpose, not even as CBM, and that they would
do more harm than good. 27 The United States then withdrew its support
for the Draft Protocol. This is ironic given the fact that in 1971, the United
States opened up its biological facilities for public inspection and
international visitors following
the destruction of its stocks of biological
28
agents - a voluntary act.'
Among the reservations expressed by the U.S. government regarding
the Draft Protocol were the concerns of the American pharmaceutical
industry regarding the protection of trade secrets. 129 The Draft Protocol
called for both challenge and non-challenge inspections of sites registered
to possess biological agents, 3 ° which the pharmaceutical industry in the

124. President William Jefferson Clinton, Remarks

at the U.S. Naval Academy

Commencement (May 22, 1998) availableat http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov.
125. U.S. Public Positions, supra note 121.
126. Id.

127. Graham S. Pearson et al., The U.S. Rejection ofthe Composite Protocol: A Huge Mistake
Based on Illogical Assessments, Bradford Evaluation Paper No. 22, at 1 (Aug. 2001), availableat:
http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/evaluation/evalu22.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
128. See U.N. Doc. 91/17, supra note 55, at 8.
129. For the purpose of U.S. law and for this Article, trade secret means information, including
a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other
persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain
its secrecy.
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985).
130. Draft Protocol, supra note 28.
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United States vigorously opposes. 3 ' The U.S. pharmaceutical industry,
represented by the industry group, PhRMA, published a position paper
calling for no non-challenge visits and limited scheduled inspections,
calling these steps necessary for the protection of CBI and facility
reputations.3 The pharmaceutical industries outside the United States
were more amenable to on-site inspections and to the Draft Protocol
generally. 33
'
While many nations and many substate interest groups have stressed
the need for an enforcement protocol for years, the progress toward such
a protocol has been halting. The Fifth Review Conference in November
2002 launched a new process toward strengthening the BWC through both
national and international procedures, since the Draft Protocol has fallen
from favor. 34 The much more recent CWC included a Verification Annex
and was vigorously supported in the United States by both parties and by
industry. This paradox is at least in part because biological weapons pose
a unique set of difficulties. The verification procedures of the CWC cannot
simply be transplanted onto the BWC. While the two types of weapons
have historically been grouped together, there are serious differences
between them that must be accounted for in any attempt to control
biological weapons. These differences go a long way in explaining why
the chemical industry and the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries
have approached the respective enforcement mechanisms in very different
ways. We must examine the differences between these types of weapons
to determine where common solutions are possible and where the unique
properties of biological weapons require novel approaches.
C. The Different Challenges Posedby Chemicaland
Biological Weapons
While similar concerns regarding CBI and on-site inspections existed
with the CWC, the situation at hand is complicated by the nature of
biological agents. Unlike chemical weapons, many of the components of
which are banned outright as having no useful, peaceful purposes, most
biological agents covered by the BWC have harmless and even beneficial

131. See PHRMA, supra note 30.
132. See id.; see also FAS Implementation Proposals, supranote 32.
133. See, e.g., SLOTEN, Biotechnology and the Strengtheningof the BTWC, in THE ROLE OF
BIoTEcHNoLOGY INCOUNTERING BTW AGENTS, supra note 36.

134. See Biological Weapons Convention, Fifth Review Conference, Final Declaration, Nov.
11-22, 2002, 18 (adopted Nov. 22, 2002), availableat http://www.opbw.org/rev cons/5rc/docs/
finaldec/BWC-CONF.V-17-(finaldoc).pdf(last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
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uses.' 35 As Henry Kelly, President ofthe Federation ofAmerican Scientists
(FAS), wrote in an editorial in the New York Times, "it is possible to
imagine a malicious use for virtually any biological research or production
site. The difference between a lab for producing lifesaving vaccines and
one capable of making deadly toxins is largely one of intent."' 36 Kelly
further stated that the problems of monitoring the use of biological agents
is exacerbated by the fact that techniques suitable to controlling nuclear
and chemical weapons are being transplanted onto the fight against
bioterrorism. The substances and equipment necessary to build an atomic
bomb may be easy to organize into a short list of contraband materials, but
"putting this sort of emphasis on materials and labs will not suffice on the
bioterrorism
front where everyday equipment could be used to create
31 7
horrors."'

Most materials that could be used to create biological weapons fall into
the category of dual use materials, that is, they have both malicious and
benign applications.' The perverse truth regarding biological agents is
that the very research and procedures that make bioterrorism possible were
likely created in the process to protect against the agent.'39 Research to
prepare vaccines and countermeasures to these biological agents requires
the use of these same dangerous materials and the same procedures to
create, cultivate, and test them. As a result, inspections for biological
agents would not be limited to a search for the presence of such agents, but
instead must be much more involved inspections into the proper use,
maintenance, and storage of biological agents in order to insure that they
are not used for improper purposes.'40
Also unlike chemical weapons components, many different entities and
sites are permitted to possess and use biological components for research
purposes, from university labs to private pharmaceutical companies. ""The
number of sites that would be subject to inspection would be larger, as

135. See KELLE & MATOUSEK, Lessons of the Chemical Weapons Conventionfor the BTWC
Protocol,in THE ROLE OF BIOTECHNOLOGY IN COUNTERING BTIW AGENTS, supra note 36, at 36.
136. Henry Kelly, Editorial, Terrorismand the Biology Lab, N.Y. TIMES, July 2,2003, at 25.
137. Id.
138. See KELLE & MATOUSEK, Lessons of the Chemical Weapons Conventionfor the BTWC
Protocol,in THE ROLE OF BIOTECHNOLOGY IN COUNTERING BTW AGENTS, supra note 36, at 40.

139. Kelly, supra note 136, at 25.
140. See KELLE & MATOUSEK, Lessons of the Chemical Weapons Conventionfor the BTWC
Protocol,in THE ROLE OF BIOTECHNOLOGY INCOUNTERING BTW AGENTS, supra note 36, at 40.
141. See Malcom R. Dando, The Strengthened BTWC Protocol: Implications for the
Biotechnology and Pharmaceutical Industry, Briefing Paper No. 17 9-13 (Mar. 2000), available
at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/briefingfbp 17.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
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would the number of sites subject to preparing declarations. 42 Only a
limited number of sites are permitted to have the type of chemical agents
that could be used to produce most chemical weapons. Many chemical
weapons have no peaceful uses, and as such, these agents and their
precursors can be placed on lists of automatic trigger agents.'43 There are
no legitimate civilian purposes for VX gas, and the presence of any VX at
a site should result in an automatic response under the CWC. As was
stated previously, the list of dual use biological agents is coextensive with
the list of dangerous biological agents.
Today's chemical weapons technology is very low-tech for the most
part and remains from early twentieth century development.'" Biological
weapons concerns, on the other hand, cover the very low-tech, naturally
occurring agents such as botulism and anthrax, to cutting edge, such as
genetically modified agents designed to be more virulent.'45 A 1993 survey
of the field by Bartfai, Lundin, and Rybeck identified three types of
potential misuse of cutting edge biotechnology: the enhancement of
bacterial and viral virulence, heterologous gene expression, and protein
engineering of toxins and genetic weapons. 4 6 In a more recent study,
Malcom Dando points out that:
the gap between theoretical possibility and practical reality seems
to be closing steadily. Significant new successes in the application
of gene therapy, in particular, should be carefully monitored and
assessed. While it can be hoped that ethnically specific weapons
will never become a reality, it would be foolish to imagine that they
are an impossibility or that incredibly precise targeting might not
become possible.' 47
Attacks utilizing chemical weapons will be easier to detect and
terminate preemptively because it takes a much larger amount of the
chemical agent to kill the same number of people compared to a biological
agent. A biological weapons attack will be much harder to detect, but

142. See KELLE & MATOUSEK, Lessons of the Chemical Weapons Conventionfor the BTWC
Protocol,in THE ROLE OF BIOTECHNOLOGY IN COUNTERING BTW AGENTS, supra note 36, at 39.
143. See id.
144. See KELLE & MATOUSEK, Lessons ofthe Chemical Weapons Conventionfor the BTWC
Protocol, in THE ROLE OF BIOTECHNOLOGY IN COUNTERING BTW AGENTS, supra note 36, at 36.
145. See id.

146. See Tamas Bartfai et al., Benefits and Threats of Developments in Biotechnology and
Genetic Engineering, 1993 SIPRI Y.B.: WORLD ARMAMENTS & DISARMAMENT 293-305.

147. Malcom Dando, Benefits and Threats of Developments in Biotechnology and Genetic
Engineering, 1999 SIPRI Y.B.: ARMAMENTS, DISARMAMENT & INT'L SECURITY 596-611.
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given the fragility of most biological agents, the existence of vaccines, and
protective measures such as masks and hazardous materials suits, a
biological weapons attack is easier to contain than prevent. 4 '
Nonetheless, as experts such as Rosenberg and Pearson have suggested,
a "web" of preventive and containment defenses needs to be created to
deal with the threat of biological weapons. 4 9 Pearson looks at arms
control, export controls, protective measures, and a determined
international and national response to development or use as being the key
elements of such a defensive web. 5 ' Rosenberg similarly looks at the
failure to respond to the use of chemical weapons usage in the Iran-Iraq
war as a failure of the defensive web to protect against chemical weapons
usage and to create a norm against the use of WMDs.' 51Both see a need
for greater response to the threat by the international community, both in
preparation for attacks and for prevention of them.'52
II.THE DRAFT PROTOCOL
The Draft Protocol included enforcement measures, each of which is
considered in turn in this section. These mechanisms included:
declarations by States Parties of a range of facilities and activities that are
relevant to the BWC to enhance transparency; visits to promote accurate
and complete declarations (non-challenge visits); investigations into
concerns of noncompliance including both field and facility investigations
(challenge visits); and the creation of a permanent organization with staff
to implement the Draft Protocol.'53
The mandate of the Ad Hoc Group required that measures should be
formulated and implemented in a manner designed to protect sensitive CBI
and legitimate national security needs, and that: "measures shall be
formulated and implemented in a manner designed to avoid any negative
impact on scientific research, international cooperation and industrial

148. See KELLE & MATOUSEK, Lessons of the Chemical Weapons Conventionfor the BTWC
Protocol,in THE ROLE OF BIOTECHNOLOGY INCOUNTERING BTW AGENTS supra note 36, at 37-38.
149. See Rosenberg, supranote 1; PEARSON, CounteringBiological Warfare: An Overview,
in THE ROLE OF BIOTECHNOLOGY IN COUNTERING BTW AGENTS, supra note 36, at 9.
150. PEARSON, Countering Biological Warfare: An Overview, in THE ROLE OF
BIOTECHNOLOGY IN COUNTERING BTW AGENTS, supranote 36, at 9.
151. See Rosenberg, supra note 1.
152. See PEARSON, Countering Biological Warfare: An Overview, in THE ROLE OF
BIOTECHNOLOGY IN COUNTERING BTW AGENTS, supranote 36, at 9; Rosenberg, supra note 1.

153. See Dando, supra note 141.
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development." '54 Representatives of the pharmaceutical industry and
supporters of the Draft Protocol disagreed as to whether the Ad Hoc Group
succeeded in drafting provisions in accordance with its twin goals of
strengthening the BWC and protecting legitimate research and
cooperation. The remainder of this part looks at each major enforcement
mechanism considered and the arguments made by supporters and
opponents of the mechanism. This part looks at the positions taken by the
European bioindustry as well as FAS and PhRMA on these issues.
A. Industry Concerns Regarding CBI
The pharmaceutical industry's concerns regarding the effects of the
Enforcement Protocol are real and legitimate. Compared to other
industries, the pharmaceutical industry relies very heavily upon research
and development and the value in its CBI. Given the immense investments
by the pharmaceutical industry into research and development, it is clear
that the products of this research and development must be protected from
industrial espionage and unfair business practices.155 Most pharmaceutical
products are very easy to mass produce once the information regarding
their production becomes available.' 56 Companies attempting to recoup
investments in research and development would see their revenues
dramatically undercut if they were forced to compete immediately with
companies able to exploit the first-mover's research without bearing any
of the costs.'5 7 If everyone is able to free ride and benefit from the
investments of the first-mover, there will be no incentive to invest in
research and development. This would, no doubt, have a chilling effect on
the entire pharmaceutical industry by keeping potentially vital drugs from
ever coming to market. In order to promote investment in research, patent
and trade secret law protects first-movers for a limited period of time with
a monopoly over their information and processes.

154. Special Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and
on Their Destruction (VEREX), Sept. 19-30, 1994, Final Declaration (Sept. 1994).
155. See Barry Kellman et al., DisarmamentandDisclosure:How Arms Control Verification
Can Proceed Without ThreateningConfidentialBusiness Information,36 HARV. INT'L L.J. 71,75
(1995).
156. Id.
157. See id. at 74-75.
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Despite the legal protections provided by patent and trade secret law,' 58
concerns remain for pharmaceutical companies. Firstly, in order for trade
secret protection to exist, whatever is being protected must obviously be
a secret.'59 Once the information becomes public, it is can no longer be
protected as a trade secret and the owner of that information no longer has
the ability to stop others from using that information for commercial
gain. 16' Employees at companies that rely upon the confidentiality of their
intellectual property are often required to sign confidentiality agreements
in order to protect the information. 6 ' Companies, however, are still
concerned with threats such as industrial espionage and attempts by
competitors to induce employees or former employees of the holder of a
trade secret to violate confidentiality agreements. 62 Further, despite the
requirements of the World Trade Organization's Agreement on Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS Agreement), different
'
countries have different levels of domestic protection for CBI. 63
While we hope that international inspectors acting under the authority
of a hypothetical BWC enforcement protocol would not be corruptible and
would not exploit or sell the CBI of inspected sites, there are still
reasonable grounds for companies to be concerned that inspections could
compromise trade secrets. Along with the concern that information will be
intentionally and maliciously exploited by inspectors, is the possibility that
declarations made to the U.S. government in conjunction with national
declaration requirements could result in the loss of CBI. 1'6 U.S firms,
leading the world in cutting edge research and development, have
particular concerns regarding the protection of CBI. 6 5 Given the relative
weight of the concerns of the industry and the importance of getting the
cooperation of private actors in the enforcement of the prohibition of
biological weapons, concerns of the pharmaceutical industry regarding
confidentiality and the protection of intellectual property must be taken

158. Protection for trade secrets in U.S. law is guaranteed. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT 14
U.L.A. 437 (1990); Food Drug and Cosmetics Act of 1938 (FDCA), Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat.
1040 (codified as amended 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397 (2000)); Federal Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1905 (2000); Freedom of Information Act (FIOA) 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000); RESTATEMENT (FIRST)
OF TORTS § 757 (1939).

159. See id.
160. See John C. Janka, FederalDisclosureStatutes andtheFifth Amendment: The New Status
of Trade Secrets, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 334, 348 (1987).
161. Kellman et al., supra note 155.
162. Id.
163. See id. at 76.
164. See id.
165. PHRMA, supra note 30.
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seriously by proponents of an enforcement regime. Any enforcement
methods considered must include significant measures to safeguard CBI,
both to protect valuable intellectual property and to empower methods of
arms control. 166 There are several types of CBI which must be protected by
any enforcement regime: confidential information about valuable research
microorganisms and information about their biological makeup;
information about proprietary process technology; confidential economic
information; 67 and test results and test protocols.
Both the U.S. industry group, PhRMA, and the European bioindustry
expressed concerns relating to the Draft Protocol. 16 The European
bioindustry, however, took a position that was more moderate than
PhRMA. 169 As the Ad Hoc Group began its work to create a Draft
Protocol, the industry's coordinating group, the Forum for European
Bioindustry Coordination (FEBC), prepared to play a role in the process.171
It created the FEBC Task Force Against Biological Weapons in 1996.'71
The group published its first position paper in 1997.172
FEBC's position on enforcement included the observation that the
CWC shows that it is essential for industry to be able to provide input to
the negotiation process and provided good examples of how to strike a fair
balance. 17' The European bioindustry's concerns regarding an enforcement
protocol are as follows:
" Scope of declarations and inspections;
" Protection of commercial and proprietary; confidential business
information;
• Costs of likely disruptions to their activities from inspections;
and

166. See id.
167. LYNN C. KLOTZ, Working Group on BW Verification, Confidentiality Can Be Protected
During Sampling and Analysis, in BWC COMPLIANCE REGIME (Sept. 1997), available at

http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/cbw/papers/wg/wgl 997_confidentiality bwccompliance_r
egime.htm.
168. FAS Implementation Proposals, supra note 32; SLOTEN, Biotechnology and the
Strengthening of the BTWC, in THE ROLE OF BIOTECHNOLOGY INCOUNTERING BTW AGENTS,
supra note 36; PHRMA, supra note 30.
169. SLOTEN, Biotechnology and the Strengthening of the BTWC, in THE ROLE OF
BIOTECHNOLOGY IN COUNTERING BTW AGENTS, supra note 36.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 47.
172. Id.
173. See id. at 48.
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Bureaucracy of dealing with complex declaration forms.174

The FEBC's official position regarding enforcement mechanisms is
that controls are acceptable when they are instrumental to the object
pursued.' 75 The FEBC's recommendations for appropriate ways to address
the aforementioned concerns are that controls must be:
*
"
*
"

Administratively manageable;
Not overly burdensome in terms of cost and manpower;
Designed to safeguard confidential business information;
Designed to respect the principle of a level playing field; and
17 6

• Applied on a universal basis.

The concerns of industry apply to three enforcement mechanisms:
declarations, challenge inspections, and non-challenge inspections.177 Both
industry and the FAS agree that the declarations should be explicitly and
narrowly tailored so as to avoid revealing CBI. 178 With regard to site
inspections, several specific concerns are presented by the industry, though
proponents of the protocol are prepared with responses.' 79
B. Declarations
Under the Draft Protocol, nations would have been required to make
declarations of certain facilities and activities that come under the purview
of the BWC.18 ° The purpose of such declarations is to increase
transparency, clarify potential points of confusion, and build confidence
in compliance.'81 As Dr. Hans Blix, the former Director-General of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the former executive
director of the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission
(UNMOVIC), has stated:

174. See SLOTEN, Biotechnology and the Strengthening of the BTWC, in THE ROLE OF
BIOTECHNOLOGY INCOUNTERING BTW AGENTS, supra note 36.
175. Id. at 48.
176. Id. at 48-49.
177. Id.;.PHRMA,supra note 30.
178. SLOTEN, Biotechnology and the Strengthening of the BTWC, in THE ROLE OF
BIOTECHNOLOGY IN COUNTERING BTW AGENTS, supra note 36; PHRMA, supra note 30; FAS
Implementation Proposals, supra note 32.
179. SLOTEN, Biotechnology and the Strengthening of the BTWC, in THE ROLE OF
BIOTECHNOLOGY INCOUNTERING BTW AGENTS, supra note 36; PHRMA, supra note 30.
180. Draft Protocol, supra note 28, art. III(D).
181. See Dando, supra note 141.
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[t]he idea of self-declaration is as basic to arms control as it is to
income tax systems. The weapons inspectors or tax man should not
need to go and find what you have. Rather, you know what
information is required and you have it, so it is for you to collect all
the relevant data and submit it for scrutiny. You declare and the
inspector verifies.' 82
The declarations would have provided States Parties with an opportunity
to properly document and describe peaceful uses of biological agents so
that they might have been distinguished from pernicious uses of such
agents; thus, explaining the nature of an issue would otherwise be a cause
of concern for the convention.'83 These declarations, while the
responsibility of the state party, would have required information about
both public and private facilities and would require the disclosure of
certain activities at these facilities.' 84 Many facilities that are purely
medical diagnostic and treatment facilities, and facilities that do not handle
the most dangerous biological agents and toxins would have been exempt
from declaration requirements. 85
' The remaining facilities that would have
fallen under the declaration requirements could have been numbered in the
dozens, according to estimates done by Malcom Dando.'86
With regard to declarations, the importance of which were recognized
by both PhRMA and FAS,' 87 the principal questions concerned the extent
and level of detail of the declarations and the thresholds or triggers to
establish for mandatory declarations. The types of activities and sites that
were to be covered in such a declaration regime under the Draft Protocol
were:
A.
B.
C.
D.

Past Offensive/Defensive Programs;
Current Defensive Programs - both activities and facilities;
Vaccine Production Facilities;
Maximum Biological Containment Laboratories - those with
a World Health Organization rating of Biosafety Level 4 (BL 4)
or P4 or equivalent;
E. High Biological Containment Laboratories - those with a
World Health Organization rating of Biosafety Level 3 (BL 3)

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

BLIX, supranote 9, at 99-100.
Dando,supra note 141.
Id.
Id.
Dando, supra note 141, conclusion.
FAS Implementing Proposals, supra note 32.
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I.
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K.
L.

165

and working with listed agents or toxins, but excluding purely
diagnostic and medical facilities;
Plant Pathogen Containment Facilities;
Sites which work with listed agents - excluding purely
diagnostic and medical facilities - and which meet certain
production capacity minimums;
Non-vaccine production facilities - sites that do not produce
listed agents, but that have a certain minimum production
capacities and which possess aerosol test chambers for work
with microorganisms or toxins; conduct research on
microorganisms for determinants of pathogenicity or toxicity,
conduct genetic modification to enhance pathogenicity,
virulence, or resistance to antibiotics;
Transfers of Listed Agents;
Appearance of Outbreaks of Disease or Epidemics;
Declarations on the Implementation of Article X of the
Convention and Article VII of the Protocol; and
National Legislation and Regulations. 88

Several of these declaration triggers were of no concern to the biotech
and pharmaceuticals industries. Nevertheless, those triggers that could
have potentially affected industry were hotly debated as to the likelihood
of over-inclusiveness or under-inclusiveness.
The FEBC task force recommended that the triggers for declarations
be precise and narrowly defined so as not to capture too many facilities
and prove an unnecessary burden on industry.'89 The European bioindustry
understood the importance of declarations as CBM to increase
transparency and prevent misunderstandings, but it feared excessive
disclosure requirements and the burdens they would place on industry.'90
According to FEBC, the declarations should have been designed to protect
CBI and there should have been no possibility of misunderstandings by the
company or the institutions regarding what was required in a
declaration.' 9 '

188. See Draft Protocol,'supra note 28, Annex 1 (The Draft Protocol has two possible lists of
declaration triggers, one which groups offensive and defensive programs together, the other has the
two listed as separate triggers). See also FAS Implementation Proposals, supranote 32, 9.
189. SLOTEN, Biotechnology and the Sterengthening of the BTWC, in THE ROLE OF
BIoTECHNoLoGY iN COUNTERING BTW AGENTS, supra note 36, at 47.

190. See id.
191. See id.
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C. Challenge Visits
Once declarations are made, the next step involved is verification.
Here, we are reminded of President Ronald Reagan's famous adage on
arms control verification, "trust, but verify."' 92 Blix's analogy to income
taxation is also helpful here, as well.
...

[T]ax men often do more than just check the counting in your

declaration. They look around in various ways to see if there were
any items which should have been declared but were not. The same
is true for arms inspectors. For instance, they may make inquiries
of exporting countries, they may study satellite images for signs of
new or expanded arms facilities, they may visit sites indicated not
only by the inspected state but also by defectors or intelligence.
Yet, the declaration is basic.' 93
The case Blix is describing is common to challenge inspections, where
there is information that suggests a state party is not in compliance with its
international responsibilities, or that it has not been truthful in its
declarations. Challenge visits, or investigations under the Draft Protocol,
could have been requested by any state party and would have been "carried
out for the sole purpose of determining the facts relating to a specific
concern about possible non-compliance with the Convention by any other
' These inspections could potentially take place at any where
State Party."194
under the jurisdiction or control of the state party. 195 These challenge
inspections could have been initiated by the complaint of another state
party, or at the behest of the Secretary General of the United Nations or the
U.N. Security Council.' 96 States Parties would have been encouraged to
engage in consultation to attempt to clarify suspected breaches before
pursuing an investigation.' 97
The appropriateness of challenge visits was not contested by FAS,
FEBC, or PhRMA. In the case of any site visit, FAS and PhRMA agreed
that managed access rules should govern inspections. There was
significant concern that on-site sampling and analysis during inspections

192.
President
note 155,
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

The saying is actually a Russian proverb, "doveryay, no proveryay," but one which
Reagan often repeated in terms of arms control verification. See Kellman et al., supra
at 77.
BLuX, supra note 9, at 100.
Draft Protocol, supra note 28, art. IIIG(A)(1).
Id.
Id.
See id.
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presents serious threats to the protection of CBI.' 98 Steps could have been
taken, mainly through the managed access vehicle, to protect all three
types of CBI - information about microorganisms, information about
proprietary process technology, and confidential economic information.
FAS responded to concerns regarding the protection of these three types
of information with the following five protective measures:
* Rigorous sampling procedures that utilize dead organisms;
• Restriction of analysis to procedures that can provide only
generic information;
" Full use of the tools available under managed access;
" Strict chain-of-custody procedures;
" Watchful monitoring of the inspections team.' 99
Using only dead organisms would have protected proprietary
information in the germ line of both traditional and recombinant strains
against theft. The theft of a single live production strain microorganism
would allow a competitor to begin producing the microorganism. Thus, the
use of dead strains would be necessary to prevent such theft and
exploitation of CBI. 2°° In any inspection regime, FAS recommends that all
testing should be done on-site and only tests that provide generic
information about the tested substance should be permitted.2 °' Managed
access, monitoring of inspectors, and strict chain-of-custody procedures
should prevent the illicit removal of CBI from the premises.2 2 These steps
would allow a site to maintain control over its CBI throughout the process.
Industry strongly supported the managed access approach to
inspections. 2 3 The managed access rules were developed for the CWC
with the assistance of the U.S. chemical industry to protect confidentiality.
Almost identical managed access rules were incorporated into the BWC
Draft Protocol. Managed access calls for negotiations between inspectors
and the inspected party as to the nature of access to particular places and
the scope and extent of inspections. 2 4 In the CWC case, it allows the
inspected party a great deal of control to insure the protectiOn of CBI and
the integrity of the site during inspections.

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

See KLOTZ, supra note 167.
Id.
See id.
FAS Implementation Proposals, supra note 32.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Under a hypothetical enforcement regime, at the inspection of
nongovernment facilities, site managers would have the right to make
managed access decisions. The U.S. Constitution's Fourth Amendment
protections against unreasonable search and seizure support the right of
operators of private facilities in making these managed access decisions.
Managers of private facilities should also be involved in reviewing the
governmental declarations that cover their facilities and in the process of
nominating and evaluating candidates for the position of inspector. Finally,
all site inspectors should be required to sign confidentiality agreements to
protect CBI.20 5 Blix himself claimed that he threatened to fire any member
of the UNMOVIC staff who failed to maintain confidentiality." 6
Drawing upon the experiences of the UNSCOM team in Iraq when
deciding upon the procedures for the UNMOVIC team in 1999, Blix
placed significant emphasis on the principle that intelligence regarding
inspections must flow only one way.20 7 Whereas the UNSCOM inspectors
were often seen as being too "cozy" with intelligence agencies, especially
with those of the United States and the United Kingdom, Blix felt that the
only way for UNMOVIC to be recognized as credible and legitimate was
for it to report only to the United Nations.2"8 As such, UNMOVIC
requested, and was grateful for, intelligence and assistance from states
interested in disarming Iraq, but it provided no intelligence information to
these states or agencies in return. All information traveled only one way.209
Similar steps would have to be taken under any enforcement regime for the
BWC. In order for confidentiality to be respected and for the enforcement
regime to be respected as legitimate, it must have strict procedures to
guarantee that intelligence flows in only one direction, and that national
intelligence agencies do not pressure the inspectors or secretariat of an
enforcement regime to compromise the national security interests and the
CBI interests of States Parties.
D. Non-ChallengeInspections
The most controversial of the recommended enforcement mechanisms
is the non-challenge inspection - an inspection not based upon any
preexisting expectation or suspicion of violation - of the facilities
governed by the BWC. In the Draft Protocol, these were referred to as

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id.
BLIX, supra note 9, at 47.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 39-40.
Id. at 47.
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randomly-selected visits or transparency visits. 2 0 The Draft Protocol
called for a limited number of these each year and they would have
covered either biodefense and BL 4 or all declared facilities. 21 ' These
inspections would have been made on the research premises with little
advanced warning (so as to prevent the inspected party from having the
ability to destroy damaging evidence). In the example of the CWC, "the
number, intensity, duration, timing, and mode of inspection of a schedule
1 facility will be based on the risk that facility poses to the objectives of
the CWC and the characteristics of that facility., 21 2 If inspections are part
of the enforcement regime under the BWC, a similar approach should be
taken toward inspected sites - the scope of the inspections, while left to
negotiations between the site managers and the inspection team, should be
roughly proportional to the potential threat posed. This proportionality will
ensure that inspections disrupt site activities as little as possible and only
to the extent necessary.
Even with limitations for proportionality based on potential threat,
there is still the possibility of threat to CBI. The call for these intensive
inspections and verification procedures has caused significant trepidation
among U.S. pharmaceutical companies. The industry, through PhRMA,
expressed concern that these very intrusive inspections will lead 2to
13
industrial espionage and the threatening of protected trade secrets.
PhRMA claims that surprise, non-challenge site inspections will make it
exceedingly difficult for companies to guard protected techniques and
processes.24 Further, PhRMA suggests that the potential damage to the
reputation of facilities that would result from being the subject of an
inspection, even a non-challenge inspection, would be significant. 5I
The European industry's position is that routine inspections are not
useful because of the ability to remove almost all traces of any
development, manufacturing, or storage within a short period of time.
Challenge inspections, instead, should be the crux of the enforcement
mechanism.216 Challenge inspections, organized through a program of
managed access will be the best verification mechanism according to the
FFBC-217 When an allegatinn nr spicoinn i hrnught f,,' d, q..st-o
and ambiguities should be resolved, whenever possible, by informal
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Draft Protocol, supra note 28, Annex I.
Id.
Kellman et al., supra note 155, at 89-90.
See PHRMA, supra note 30; see also FAS Implementation Proposals, supra note 32.
See PHRMA, supra note 30.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 133.
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consultations and other cooperative measures before a challenge inspection
is considered. Clarification measures should be the principal method of
settling misunderstandings and under full control of the site.2" 8
The FAS strongly disagrees with the FEBC's and PhRMA's position
that non-challenge inspections provide more costs than benefits and
considers non-challenge inspections a vital part of any functioning
enforcement mechanism.2" 9 The FAS position is that the same managed
access program that would protect CBI in challenge inspections will
function just as well in the non-challenge scenario. 22 0 The non-challenge
inspections are vital, according to FAS, because of their surprise nature.221
If inspections are random and are conducted with little warning, it will be
far more difficult for those wishing to produce and stockpile biological
weapons to do so on a significant scale.222 Further, the inspections will
safeguard good practices at innocent facilities and prevent the misuse of
biological agents by those who might otherwise have access to them and
who would use them to attempt to produce weapons.223
Pearson argues that these inspections under the Draft Protocol would
have been far less frequent and less intrusive than routine inspections for
the health and safety of employees and for the safety of pharmaceutical
products carried out by national regulatory agencies. 224 The frequency of
visits to facilities in the United States under the projected protocol was
seven or fewer per year.225 Pearson also points to the fact that protections
for commercial proprietary information were stronger in the Draft Protocol
than the similar protections in the CWC, which the United States
supported and signed.2 26

IV. LESSONS FROM THE CWC

The Draft Protocol was effectively abandoned at the end of 2001 when
the United States declared that it opposed the protocol and any continued

218. See id.
219. FAS Implementation Proposals, supranote 32.

220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.

223. Id.
224. Graham S. Pearson, The US. Rejection of the Protocolat the Eleventh Hour Damages
International Security Against Biological Weapons, 53 CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

CONVENTIONS BuLL. 6, 7 (2001).
225. Id.
226. Id.
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efforts by the AdHoc group to amend the BWC.2 27 Discussions of
strengthening the BWC by amending enforcement provisions have since
been tabled and may be taken up again at the Sixth Meeting of the States
Parties in 2006.228 When the States Parties meet again in 2006, they will
take up the recommendations made by expert committees that have met
during the last few years to discuss codes of conduct and other nonbinding attempts to improve compliance. 229 The creation of an
enforcement regime for the BWC presents different and more complicated
issues than the creation of the Verification and Confidentiality Annexes of
the CWC. There are, however, lessons to be learned from the CWC model,
especially with regard to managed access as a solution to questions of
protecting CBI. This Article explores the lessons regarding weapons
control that can be learned and applied from experiences with the CWC
and with the search for WMDs in Iraq.
A. The Annex on Chemicals
The CWC Annex on Chemicals covers three types of chemical agents,
which are organized into schedules by their lethality and potential uses.23 °
This organizational structure resembles a proposal for regulation put
forward by the United States in 1984, to categorize agents as "super-toxic
lethal chemicals,....other lethal chemicals," or "other harmful
chemicals. 231 Schedule 1 chemicals have little or no peaceful uses.232
They are actual weapons, can be used as weapons, are precursors to
weapons, or can be converted to weapons. 33 Among the thirteen
schedule 1 chemicals are ricin and VX. 3 4 Schedule 2 chemicals are not

produced in large commercial quantities for purposes not prohibited under
the convention. 235 These chemicals also pose a significant risk to the

227. See Graham S. Person et al., The U.S. Statement at the Fifth Review Conference:
Compounding the Error in Rejecting the Composite Protocol, Review Conference Paper No. 4 (Jan.
2002), availableat http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/briefing/RCP_4.pdf.
228. See Graham S. Pearson & Nicholas A. Sims, Preparing for the BTWC Sixth Review
Conference in 2006, Review Conference Paper No. 10 (Jan. 2005), availableat http://www.brad.
ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/briefing/RCPl 0.pdf.
229. See, e.g., Biological Weapons Convention, 2005 Meeting of the Experts, Working Papers,
June 13-24, 2005, BWCIMSP/2005/MX/WP. 1, available at http://www.opbw.org/.
230. CWC, supra note 109, pt. A., Annex on Chemicals.
231. WALTER KRUTZSCH & RALF TRAPP, A COMMENTARY ON THE CHEMICAL WEAPONSCONVENTION 257 (1994).

232.
233.
234.
235.

CWC, supra note 109, pt. A., Annex on Chemicals.
Id.Chemical Annex pt. Al.
Id. pt. B.
Id. pt. A.
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objects and purposes of the CWC2 36 and include arsenic trichloride and
PFIBs. 2 7 Schedule 3 chemical agents are dual-use chemicals; they can be
used as weapons or as precursors to weapons, but they also have peaceful,
legitimate uses for scientific and industrial purposes.238 These chemicals
may be produced in large commercial quantities for purposes not
prohibited under the CWC 23 9 and among these chemicals are hydrogen
cyanide and sulfur dichloride. 24
In order to address the problem of development of new chemical
weapons or potential weapons, the Annex on Chemicals is the only part of
the CWC that can be amended under the change-procedure of Article XV;
additions and deletions can be made to the schedules without the
amendment procedure, thus providing flexibility to the CWC. 24 ' Along
with adding new chemicals and deleting old ones from the schedules,
chemicals can be transferred to a different category if the need arises.242
Any quantity of schedule 1 chemicals will trigger a violation for almost
any declared facility (and for any undeclared facility), private or
governmental.243 Any schedule 2 chemicals above the amount listed in
proper declarations will trigger violations, as will any amount of schedule
2 chemicals at sites not authorized to possess them. Schedule 3 - dual use
- chemicals pose challenges similar to those with biological weapons. 2 "
Their presence should be expected at certain declared, private or
governmental facilities, along with the machinery and technology to
produce them. 245 As such, declaration forms and inspection protocols
dealing with these schedule 3 chemical agents can be useful in tailoring
declarations and protocols for biological agents under the BWC. 24
B. The VerificationAnnex
The Verification Annex of the CWC has separate parts for the different
schedules of chemicals.247 Part VI addresses schedule 1 chemicals and
includes stringent declaration requirements; the first declaration must be
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

Id.
CWC, supra note 109, pt. B.
See id. pt. A., Annex on Chemicals.
Id.
Id. pt. B.
KRuTZSCH & TRAPP, supra note 231, at 259.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
KRuTZSCH & TRAPP, supra note 231, at 259.
CWC, supranote 109, Verification Annex.
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received no later than 30 days after the CWC's entry into force, and
subsequent annual declarations must be made no more than 90 days after
the beginning of each year. 48 In the event that a new schedule 1 facility is
to be opened, the declaration for that facility must be received no fewer
than 180 days before the facility opening.249 Part VI also limits the number
of facilities that may possess these chemicals to one single small-scale
facility and other very limited facilities. 2 0 The inspections of these
facilities will be proportional to the risk the facility poses to the object and
purpose of the CWC.2 '
Part VH of the Verification Annex addresses schedule 2 chemicals and
includes minimum amounts of these chemicals needed to trigger the
declaration requirement. Part VII also lists the declaration schedule for
facilities declaring under schedule 2 (which is similar to the schedule for
schedule 1 facilities - the initial declaration must be submitted within 30
days of the entry into force, annual declarations must be made within 90
days of the beginning of the year).252 Unlike schedule 1 facilities, there are
no express limits on the number of schedule 2 chemicals, no limits to
small-scale facilities, and small quantities of schedule 2 chemicals do not
trigger declaration requirements, while any amount of schedule 1
chemicals will trigger mandatory declarations.253 Inspections for schedule
2 declarations have the general aim of ensuring that no undeclared
schedule 1 chemicals are present, that the levels of production, processing,
or consumption of schedule 2 chemicals are consistent with declarations,
and that there is no diversion
of schedule 2 chemicals to activities
254
prohibited under the CWC.
Schedule 3 chemicals are covered under Part VIII, and are subject to
the same declaration timetable as schedule 2 chemicals. 255 Like those
regulated under schedule 2, schedule 3 chemicals only trigger mandatory
declarations when they are present in large enough quantities to pose a
threat to the object and purpose of the CWC. 256 The amount of information
required in the declarations varies among schedule 1, 2, and 3 chemicals,
with schedule 1 declarations being more demanding and thorough than

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Id. pt. VI.
Id.
Id.
Id.
CWC, supra note 109, Verification Annex. pt. VII.
Id. pt. VII.
Id.
Id. pt. VIII.
Id.
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schedule 3 declarations.257 As with schedule 2 facilities, those regulated
under schedule 3 will not be the subject of a non-challenge visit more than
twice per calendar year. 258 Non-challenge site visits for schedule 3
facilities will be randomized and based on equitable geographic
distributions.259
Part IX of the Annex addresses other chemical production facilities and
the triggers for mandatory declarations for those sites that do not work
with any of the schedule 1 or 2 chemicals or significant quantities of
schedule 3 chemicals.2 60 This Part of the Annex was one of the last
elements to enter the Convention and was designed as a compromise to the
controversial issue of the extent of routine inspections for those facilities
that do not produce schedule 1 or 2 chemicals.26 ' Unlike the other Parts,
which specify particular chemicals that trigger declarations, Part IX
addresses "unscheduled discrete organic chemicals" and requires
declarations that give approximations of the amounts of chemicals
produced.262 Inspection schedules for facilities covered by Part IX are
similar to those for schedule 3 facilities.263 Just as inspections and
verification methods for the CWC are tailored to the level of threat posed
by the facility to the object and purpose of the convention, so too should
verification measures under the BWC be designed. The compromises over
schedule 3 and other chemical production facilities can provide guidance
for the governance of commercial facilities that will fall under the BWC
regime.
Part X of the Verification Annex concerns challenge inspections
pursuant to Article IX of the CWC. 264 A Challenge inspection is defined
for the purpose of the CWC as "the inspection of any facility or location
in the territory or in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of a
State Party requested by another State Party pursuant to Article IX,
paragraphs 8 to 25 ",265 of the CWC. As was the case in the Draft Protocol,
States Parties are encouraged to first take cooperative steps and consult in
order to clarify any issues of suspected noncompliance.266 If bilateral
consultations are undesired or unsuccessful, a state party may request the

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

CompareCWC, supra note 109, Verification Annex, pt. VIII, with id.pts. VI, VII.
Id. pt. VIII.
Id.
Id. pt. IX.
KRUTZSCH & TRAPP, supra note 231, at 456.
CWC, supra note 109, pt. IX, Verification Annex.
Compare id., with id. pt. VIII.
Id.pt. X.
Id.
Compare id. art. IX, with Draft Protocol, supra note 28, at 70.
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Executive Council obtain clarification from another state party,26 7 allowing
a neutral, official organ of the Organisation of the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (OPCW) to mediate the dispute.268 While preference is given to
non-adversarial proceedings, each state party has the right to request a
challenge inspection.269 Upon receiving the request for a challenge
inspection, the Director- General of the OPCW must inform the state party
to be visited of the timing, nature, point of entry, the nature of the
complaint, and limits of the visit.2 7° Specific rules are delineated for entry

into the inspected facility, security, the course of inspections, and
departure.27' The inspection team shall be guided by the principle of
conducting the challenge inspection in the least intrusive manner possible,
consistent with the effective and timely accomplishment of its mission. 2
In order to achieve the balance between robust inspections and protection
for CBI, the Verification Annex has significant managed access provisions
to protect confidential information.273
The managed access procedures, which have been discussed above,
were initially developed by the British in response to concerns of
confidentiality, largely raised by the Soviet Union, during the early stages
of work on the CWC. 2 74 In 1984, the Reagan administration put forward
its position on chemical weapons inspections - "anywhere, any time, with
no right of refusal" - in the fiscal 1986 Defense Department report: "[w]e
realize that such a verification measure is unprecedented, but the risks of
the status quo or of an unverifiable treaty are so severe that they far
outweigh the risks of allowing international inspection teams into our
sensitive facilities.

'27

The U.S. position was rejected by the Soviet Union,

at first, but when the USSR called the U.S. bluff, the United States found
itself unable to back down from an untenable policy. The British managed
access approach was one of anywhere, any time, but not completely
unfettered access, and it rescued all parties from an impossible position.276
The managed access approach in the CWC includes protection for
sensitive papers, displays, store equipment, electronic systems, and data

267. Compareid., with Draft Protocol, supranote 28, at 70.
268. KRUTZSCH&TRAPP, Supra note 231, at 179.

269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

CWC, supra note 109, art. IX.
Id. pt. X, Verification Annex.
See id.
Id.
Id.
J. CHRISTIAN KESSLER, VERIFYING NONPROLIFERATION TREATIES 78 (1995).

Id.
See id.
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indicating devices.277 The approach also limits access to sensitive sites by
limiting the number of inspectors who are given access, by using a
sampling of sensitive sites for random inspections, 278 and through facility
agreements negotiated by the state party, the site managers, and the
Director-General. These same protections were incorporated into the BWC
Draft Protocol.279
C. The ConfidentialityAnnex
Along with the managed access provisions, designed to minimize
intrusions into sensitive work and information and to limit disruptions of
legitimate facility operations, the CWC includes a Confidentiality Annex
to promote the protection of sensitive information.28 ° Under the
Confidentiality Annex of the CWC, the Director-General maintains
primary responsibility for the maintenance of confidentiality. 281 The
Director-General and the States Parties are called upon to negotiate
individual secrecy agreements.282 The States Parties are called upon to
cooperate with the Director-General in investigating breaches and alleged
breaches. 283 The Director-General has discretion and authority to impose
appropriate punitive and disciplinary measures on staff members who have
violated their obligations to protect confidential information.284 The
OPCW, however, shall not be held liable for any breach of confidentiality
committed by members of the Technical Secretariat.285 The inspectors are
granted the same types of privileges and immunities granted to diplomats
under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, but the DirectorGeneral can waive immunity for inspectors if the Director-General deems
immunity would impede the course of justice.286
Kellman, Gualtieri, and Tanzman, in their review of the protection of
CBI under the CWC, give a detailed analysis of various protective and
remedial measures available under international and U.S. law.287 Since the
writing of their article, the United States has passed implementing
legislation for the CWC, which includes guarantees of constitutional
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

CWC, supra note 109, pt. X, Verification Annex.
Id. pt. X; see also arts. IV, V, & VI.
Draft Protocol, supra note 28, art. III, Annex.
CWC, supra note 109, Confidentiality Annex.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
CWC, supra note 109, Confidentiality Annex.
Id. pt. II, Verification Annex.
Kellman et al., supra note 155, at 135-36.
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protections against unreasonable searches and seizures, 281 Civil liability for
the federal government for takings related to the implementation of the
CWC, 28 9 and statutory protection under exemption 3 to the Freedom of
Information Act for all confidential information collected in accordance
with the CWC. 290 Under section 103, the United States has civil liability
for takings and tort liability claims.29 ' Section 103(a)(1), the U.S. Court of
Federal Claims and the district courts of the United States have concurrent
jurisdiction.292 Section 103(e) provides for recoupment of damages paid by
the United States from states or foreign agents if they knowingly caused
the loss of the CBI. 293 Sanctions may also be applied under this provision
against those companies and nations involved in the knowing violation of
confidentiality. 294 These protections cover both the prevention of loss of
CBI and redress for loss of CBI and apply to information lost in
inspections and in declarations.295 Similar protections should be
incorporated into any implementing legislation for a hypothetical BWC
enforcement regime.
D. Industry PositionsandArgumentsfor US. Ratification
The chemical industry in the United States not only supported the
CWC, it was involved in the process of negotiating the convention. 296 It
was the position of the Chemical Manufacturers Association that the
obligations under the CWC would not pose an undue burden.297
Nevertheless, it would pose some significant costs on industry. Speaking
for the industry, Will Carpenter stated that:
[t]he inescapable conclusion, from our perspective, is that a useful
treaty will have a negative impact on the chemical industry. The
challenge to those participating in the process is to obtain that valid,
verifiable document while minimizing that negative impact, which
includes the cost of compliance and of meeting the reporting
288. Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998, § 102 [hereinafter CWC
Implementation Act].
289. Id. § 103(d)(3).
290. Id. § 404.
291. Id. § 103.
292. Id. § 103(a)(1).
293. CWC Implementation Act § 103(e)(1).
294. Id. §§ 103(e)(2)-103(e)(3).
295. Id.
296. DONALD A. MAHLEY, The CWC and the U.S. National Interest, in RATIFYING THE
CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION 20, 28 (Brad Roberts ed., 1994).
297. Id.
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requirements, as well as educating and assigning people to meet
those requirements.298
To achieve this end, the U.S. government has worked with industry to
educate and prepare industry for its responsibilities under the CWC. The
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) sponsored a series
of seminars across the United States to educate industry about its
responsibilities under the CWC and to address industry questions and
concerns. 299 According to Carpenter, Chairman of the board of Agridyne
Tehcnologies, Inc. and representative of the Chemical Manufacturers
Association to the U.S. government on the chemical disarmament
negotiations, the CWC "achieved an adequate trade-off between the need
for intrusive verification for a useful treaty, on the one hand, and
minimizing the damage to industry on the other."3°°
According to Richard Clarke, it was the high level of cooperation
between industry and the government that made negotiating the treaty and
producing a satisfactory result possible.3 "° The chemical industry's
concerns were ably represented by the Chemical Manufacturers'
Association and government was able to meet those concerns in
negotiating the text of the CWC.30 2 While pharmaceuticals are produced
principally with chemicals, and not biological agents, PhRMA was not
involved in the process of negotiating the CWC because the chemicals
covered in the Chemical Annex of the CWC are not generally used in the
production of pharmaceuticals or in the bioindustry.3 °3
Experts in the field of disarmament listed several reasons why
supporting the CWC was imperative for the United States. The CWC was
called the only instrument available to establish, as the unqualified
international norm, the position that chemical weapons are categorically
banned as a means of warfare.3 4 Further, the CWC would provide the
United States leverage to compel other states to abide by this norm and the

298. WILL D. CARPENTER, Understanding Chemical Industry Support for the CWC, in
supra note 296, at 30.
299. JOHN D. HOLUM, The Clinton Administrationand the Chemical Weapons Convention:

RATIFYING THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION,

The Needfor Early Ratification,in RATIFYING THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION, supranote

296, at 8.
300. CARPENTER, UnderstandingChemicalIndustry Supportforthe CWC, in RATIFYING THE
CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION, supra note 296, at 30.
301. Interview with Richard Clarke conducted at Harvard University, Apr. 21, 2004.

302. Id.
303. Id.

304. See MAHLEY, The CWC and the U.S. National Interest, in RATIFYING THE CHEMICAL
WEAPONS CONVENTION, supra note 296, at 21.
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CWC would allow for the imposition of penalties on those states that do
not adhere to these standards of conduct." 5
John Holum, the director of ACDA, argued that the CWC was
necessary to create a categorical norm against either first-strike or
retaliatory use of chemical weapons. °6 He further stated that arms control
is becoming increasingly a multilateral endeavor,3 0 7 and that the United
States had to ratify the CWC in order to demonstrate international
leadership.3 8 Holum points to several aspects of the CWC as important,
both for chemical weapons disarmament and for future disarmament
treaties.30 9 Among these is the nondiscriminatory nature of the CWC.
There are no distinctions among classes of adherents; all parties are
equally subject to all provisions.310
Donald Mahley, who served as the U.S. representative to the
Preparatory Commission for the OPCW gave another argument for U.S.
support of the CWC.31'" The reputation and efficiency of the CWC regime,
he argued, would be built in its first few years.3 12 Being among the original
parties would enhance the confidence of the United States in the OPCW
and give the United States a base for facilitating the capabilities of the
organization.313
V. THE NEED FOR A STRONG ENFORCEMENT REGIME
We should turn back to the words of David Kay if we need convincing
that an enforcement regime is necessary. In his final report to the Senate,
Kay said: "[t]here's a long record here of being wrong. There's a good
reason for it. There are probably multiple reasons. Certainly proliferation
is a hard thing to track, particularly in countries that deny easy and free
access and don't have free and open societies."3" 4 It is precisely because
proliferation is so difficult to track and because transparency must often

305. See id.
306. HOLuM, The Clinton Administrationand the Chemical Weapons Convention: The Need
for Early Ratification, in RATIFYING THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION, supra note 296, at
6.
307. Id.at 8.
308. Id. at 9.
309. Id at 8.
310. Id.
311. MAHLEY, The CWC and the U.S. National Interest, in RATIFYING THE CHEMICAL
WEAPONS CONVENTION, supra note 296, at 25.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Kay, supra note 11.
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be forced upon nations that an enforcement protocol is necessary. Kay
himself has endorsed the creation of an enforcement mechanism with a
credible inspection regime.3" 5
Many international enforcement mechanisms grow in a deep, then
broad manner, with like-minded nations agreeing to bind themselves and
then allowing all other nations willing to accept the limitations and
restrictions of the agreement to become full fledged parties by ratifying the
agreement. The World Trade Organization functions under this
assumption, with no junior members.3 1 6 Instead, all members are expected
to make similar concessions, which then apply to all other members on a
Most Favored Nation basis.3 17 Among political scientists who study
international cooperation, there is also a theory that widespread
cooperation can be done on a "broad, then deep" basis.318 First steps in
response to international problems often do not require substantial
commitments from all parties binding only some states and encouraging
others to voluntarily follow the requirements of the agreement. This is the
case with the Kyoto Protocol, which did not require the developing nations
to agree to any sort of limitations of greenhouse gas emissions." 9
In order for an enforcement regime for the BWC to be truly successful,
however, it must bind all nations equally. As Holum pointed out with
regard to the CWC, its nondiscriminatory nature was an integral part of the
Convention.32 ° A legal approach to the enforcement of the ban on
biological weapons cannot have different rules for the white hats and the
black hats. The rogue states that the United States believes are producing
biological weapons are unlikely to allow inspections if the United States
does not submit to those same requirements. As with the International
Criminal Court, protestations that Americans are different and should be
exempted from inspections or enforcement are likely to fall upon deaf ears.
As Nicholas Sims argued - when encouraging other States Parties to
go forward with the Draft Protocol despite American opposition - the
deep then broad approach that binds all parties to all the legal requirements

315. David Kay, response to question posed by the author at Harvard University, Mar. 22,
2004.
316. GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE art. 1(1947).
317. Id.
318. For a discussion of the "broad then deep" approach in the global climate change field,
see DAVID G. VICTOR, COLLAPSE OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL (2001).
319. See KYOTO PROTOCOL TO THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, Dec. 11, 1997.
320. See HOLUM, The Clinton Administrationand the Chemical Weapons Convention: The
Needfor EarlyRatification,in RATIFYING THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION, supra note 296,
at8.
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of the treaty has its advantages, even when the founding states are all likeminded nations, which are unlikely to be violators:
[t]reaty relationships solidify an agreed norm of behaviour and
make it harder to overturn. Each state party stands guard over the
others, and the watchfulness of treaty partners discourages
backsliding. The relevance of this to the Protocol is that the latter
would have value even if initially confined to a core group of states
most strongly committed to the BWC and least likely to be
suspected of undermining it. They would be mutually supportive in
reinforcing, and giving organised expression to, their shared
commitment.
They would bear the costs, of the Organisation, and of compliance
more generally; but they would also be in charge. Governments
want to be where key decisions are being taken. They would be in
a strong position from the start to shape an OPBW which both
served their own interests as a core group and turned an open face
to the rest of
the world so as to attract steadily widening
21
participation.1
A political approach will allow for the distinction between white hats
and black hats, preventing low-threat institutions, including U.S. and EU
pharmaceutical industries, from being captured. Such a political approach
taken by a single state to find specific risks and to react based on perceived
threat will not be an effective approach to the problem of biological
weapons. The intelligence gaps that create situations such as the one in
Iraq are likely to remain indefinitely. An enforcement regime designed to
increase transparency and eliminate misunderstandings will help reduce
the uncertainty and close these intelligence gaps.
A further problem with the exceptionalist approach for the United
States is an economic issue. Other states are unlikely to bind their
- .-
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pharmaceutical industry is not similarly
Industry outside the
United States can be expected to lobby national governments vigorously
to avoid the inequitable application of costs associated with applying the
BWC enforcement protocol to all but American companies. Given the
immense market share the U.S. pharmaceutical industry enjoys, its
exemption from the costs of enforcement can be expected to have a
321. Sims, supra note 27, at 6
322. See id. at 4.
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significant impact on the worldwide industry and foreign pharmaceutical
companies will work hard to avoid this scenario.
If the international community is serious about an enforcement
mechanism for the BWC, there is no halfway. Some degree of sovereignty
must be ceded. to an international enforcement mechanism and real
consequences must exist for failing to cooperate with the enforcement
mechanisms. While the Verification Annex of the CWC calls for
declarations, it provides no consequences for failure to cooperate.323 As a
result, many countries failed to produce the required declarations on time.
Of the 130 declarations made, twenty-eight declarations were wrong.324
Countries found to be in substantive violation of the CWC, do however,
face consequences. Article XII of the CWC includes collective measures
to redress a situation and ensure compliance, including sanctions.3 25 The
measures in Article XII include referral of a situation of violation to the
Security Council as well as suspension of benefits and rights under the
3 26
CWC.
The CWC not only includes obligations, it also provides its
members with economic benefits - members of the CWC can engage in
exchanges of scientific information and technology only with other
members in good standing of the CWC. 3 27 Article XII measures in
response to noncompliance includes a suspension of these benefits.328
Similar economic incentives should be built into any enforcement regime
for the BWC, along with the ability to refer noncompliance to the U.N.
Security Council as an issue of concern to international peace and
security. 329 Economic incentives may also be useful in encouraging timely
and accurate declarations.
If past U.S. policy toward enforceable international conventions that
limit sovereignty is any indication of likely future behavior, however, there
is reason for concern. In the realm of international human rights law, the
United States has mixed the legal and political approaches, claiming a sort
of exceptionalism for the United States to justify the enforcement of legal
obligations on other nations while refusing to submit to those same
obligations. As Professor Andrew Moravcsik points out in The Paradox
of U.S. Human Rights Foreign Policy, a confluence of political factors
unique to the United States results in a deep commitment to norms and
323. KELLE & MATOUSEK, Lessons of the Chemical Weapons Convention for the BTWC
Protocol,in THE ROLE OF BIOTECHNOLOGY INCOUNTERING BTW AGENTS, supra note 36, at 40.
324. Id.
325. CWC, supra note 109, art. XII.
326. Id.
327. Id. art. XII.
328. Id.
329. U.N. CHARTER ch. VII.
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their enforcement abroad, as well flat rejection of any attempt to submit to
international authority in the enforcement ofthese norms within the United
States.33°
With regard to U.S. human rights policy, the Lawyer's Committee on
Human Rights has claimed that the view of the American government is
that "one set of rules belongs to the U.S. and another to the rest of the
world."3 3 ' Both Human Rights Watch and the American Civil Liberties
Union attacked the U.S. ratification of the U.N. International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) because of the long list of reservations
entered by the United States, resulting in what these groups termed a "half
step" based on "the cynical view of international human rights law as a
'
source of protection only for those outside U.S. borders."332
The notion of American exceptionalism to international law must give
way in order for a strong enforcement mechanism to function properly.
The failure of the United States to support the Draft Protocol to the BWC
was costly. The failure of the international community to create an
enforcement regime for the BWC has meant a great deal of time, effort,
and political will was expended and we are still without any credible
method of enforcing the norm against biological weapons. The "New
Process" (as it has been dubbed by the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention Web Site)333 will hold week-long meetings each year in the
lead up to the Sixth Review Conference in 2006. The agenda for these
meetings will include discussions of both national and international
measures to strengthen the BWC. Domestic measures alone will not be
enough to strengthen the BWC. While domestic implementation of the
BWC is imperative, without a strong international enforcement regime, the
BWC will remain toothless.

330.

The Paradox of U.S. Human Rights Policy, in AMERICAN
RIGHTS (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2003), available at
http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/-moravcs/publications.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
331. Letter from the Lawyer's Committee on Human Rights to Senator Claiborne Pell, 14
HUM. RTs. L.J. 129 (1992); TONY EVANS, U.S. HEGEMONY AND THE PROJECT OF UNIVERSAL
HUMAN RIGHTS 189 (1996).
332. HuMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: A REPORT ON U.S. COMPLIANCE
WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 2 (1993).
333. See The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Website, available at
http://www.opbw.org (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
ANDREW MORAVCSEK,

EXCEPTIONALISM

AND

HUMAN

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2005

47

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 17, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 7

FLORIDA JOURNAL OFINTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 17

VI. CONCLUSIONS

This Article has shown that the United States should support a strong
enforcement regime because the threat of biological weapons is so great
as to justify the expenses that may accompany an international
enforcement mechanism. The U.S. dual concerns - protecting the
legitimate interests of the pharmaceutical industry and the pressing need
to prevent the production, stockpiling, and proliferation of WMDs - can
be met, but only within an international framework. The Bioterrorism Act
is a good start in the process of improving preparedness for an attack, but
it is not enough. In order to prevent a biological weapons attack, the
United States must work with the international community. Similar to
concerns over environmental degradation and international trafficking, the
production and use of biological agents is a truly global concern and it
must be addressed globally.
The issue of biological weapons cannot be addressed in the
international sphere on an ad hoc basis. Just as the International Criminal
Court, (another international institution opposed by the United States), was
formed to create a permanent forum for dealing with a significant
international concern, the international enforcement mechanism for the
BWC is being promulgated in order to capture the institutional knowledge
and capabilities of experts needed in the field of biological agents
inspection.
Currently, the only force capable of completing biological weapons
inspections in the world is UNMOVIC, created to search for weapons in
Iraq. If UNMOVIC is disbanded, gone with it will be the collective
knowledge and experience of its leadership and its inspectors. While
UNMOVIC has lost its primary purpose, like other international
institutions, it can be adapted and incorporated into the BWC enforcement
system in order to capture its experience and expertise. These institutions
must be preserved to deal with concerns over noncompliance. The earlier
claims made against the Soviet Union regarding Sverdlovsk and the use of
yellow rain were never adequately addressed because no institution with
the capacity or legitimacy to investigate such claims existed at the time.
The IAEA relies upon its ability to inspect and verify compliance
among its members. The organization would be toothless without these
powers. Today, we rely upon the IAEA to prevent the proliferation of
nuclear weapons, and we accept its importance as one part in the web of
nuclear nonproliferation. Growing concerns regarding Iran and North
Korea's noncompliance with their duties under the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty have been dealt with using multiple tools,
including IAEA inspectors and pressure placed on the nations to abide by
their own international obligations. The BWC must have similar powers
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to inspect and verify compliance if it is to be an effective part of the web
of protection against biological weapons proliferation.
The ease with which biological agents can be hidden or transferred and
the inherent difficulty in detecting them requires a standing institution to
carry out inspections. It will not be feasible to pull together inspection
teams ad hoc to deal with problems as they arise. Only an international
entity will have the credibility and the legitimacy to complete this task. As
recent efforts to disarm Libya and Iran have demonstrated, the apparent
internationality and impartiality of inspection teams has been a point of
contention. The ability to draw from a pool of inspectors, acting
independently of their respective nations, and the ability of nations to
challenge specific inspectors will enhance the legitimacy of an inspection
program, which will lead to more transparency across the board.
The managed access provisions of the CWC can be successfully
transferred to a BWC enforcement regime to protect confidential
processes. For the elements of biological agents that make them distinct
from chemical agents, and thus require separate protection, the provisions
suggested by FAS can be used to complement protection of confidential
property. Institutions should be involved in every step of the process of
creating guidelines and methods of testing that will protect their
confidential information while providing inspectors with the necessary
information.
Industry and government should work together in creating the
necessary implementing legislation, and in the process of vetting
candidates for the international inspection teams and for leadership in the
BWC enforcement program. Industry should be consulted in the creation
of preparing declarations and in the negotiations between the state party
and the inspection team in determining the scope of inspections and the
steps necessary to protect CBI. The Bioterrorism Act provides for this type
of cooperation in the domestic control of hazardous biological agents, and
this same cooperation should be applied to the international enforcement
of the ban on biological weapons.3 34
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biological weapons. As the hunt for Saddam Hussein's suspected weapons
program has shown, using force to dismantle a biological weapons threat
is a difficult and costly process with mixed results at best. In order to fight
the scourge of biological weapons, a multilateral approach is best for the
United States and for the international community. If the process goes
forward without U.S. support, the results will be negative, both for the
United States and for the enforcement institution of the BWC. Failing to
334. See Bioterrorism Act § 108.
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participate in the process of creating an enforcement institution will
prevent the United States from exerting any influence on the direction and
structure of the institution, an argument that had been made to support
U.S. involvement in the creation of the International Criminal Court335 and
to explain why remaining outside the EU for so long was
counterproductive for Great Britain.336 Similarly, the enforcement
mechanism will suffer if it is not supported by the world's most powerful
nation. The only way to deal with this threat effectively is through
international cooperation.
The enforcement regime will not completely protect the world against
the use ofbiological weapons. The prevention of the weapons proliferation
is a complicated and difficult task. An enforcement regime to increase
transparency and build confidence is an integral part of the web of defense
that must be created to prevent and protect against a biological weapons
attack. Biological weapons pose a huge threat to international security and
the States Parties must use a multi-pronged approach. A key part of our
strategy must be international cooperation to prevent the production of
these weapons by governments and sub-state actors. No single nation can
prevent the proliferation of these weapons alone. The potential costs of a
biological attack are so great that it would be foolish for the United States
to forego the enforcement regime and try to prevent the use of biological
weapons unilaterally.

335. See generally KENNETH ROTH ET AL., TOWARD AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT?

(1998).
336. See generally LAURENCE MARTIN & JOHN GARNETT, BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY:
CHALLENGES AND CHOICES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (1997); JOHN TURNER, THE TORIEs AND
EUROPE (2000).
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